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Articles

The People’s Court: On the Intellectual
Origins of American Judicial Power
Ian Bartrum*
ABSTRACT
This article enters into the modern debate between “constitutional departmentalists”—who contend that the executive and
legislative branches share constitutional interpretive authority
with the courts—and what are sometimes called “judicial
supremacists.” After exploring the relevant history of political
ideas, I join the modern minority of voices in the latter camp.
This is an intellectual history of two evolving political
ideas—popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—which
merged in the making of American judicial power, and I argue
we can only understand the structural function of judicial review
by bringing these ideas together into an integrated whole. Or, put
another way, we must expand the traditional conception of the
“separation of powers” to include not just distinct institutional
functions, but also the structured division of the sovereign pre* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV. Thanks to Akhil
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rogative itself, both within and without the institutions of government. It then becomes possible to read Article III as part of a
larger effort to unbundle the metaphorical sticks of traditional
sovereign power, and to vest what I call the revolutionary prerogative in an independent judicial branch.
This prerogative establishes an institutional form through
which the Court might invoke John Locke’s famous “revolution
principle” on behalf of the sovereign People. It thus allows for
what James Wilson celebrated—and what Sir William Blackstone
could not conceive—the possibility of legalized revolution. In
other words, the revolutionary prerogative allows for formal, independent appeal of the terms of the constitutional contract, by
which the People delegated limited and contingent authority to
their legislative and executive agents. Indeed, it is the final legal
step before constitutional amendment or dissolution. Of course,
the People retain the ultimate sovereign prerogative to declare
the state of exception, but once constituted, the meaning of our
fundamental law remains firmly, and solely, a matter of judicial
discretion.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent scholarship has shed considerable light on the intellectual traditions that informed our Constitution’s framers and ratifiers as they took up their unprecedented work in the late 1780s.1
In particular, Michael McConnell’s illuminating study of the structure of Article II is a remarkable addition to our understanding of
historical ideas about the relationship between legislative and executive authority.2 At this moment, with our “so-called judge[s]”
under renewed scrutiny—and a President who has openly
1. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment
Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 (2002); Michael McConnell, The Logical Structure
of Article II, (draft, on file with author).
2. McConnell, supra note 1.
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threatened to defy the Supreme Court—it is worthwhile, I think, to
explore the intellectual history of our Article III courts.3 In what
follows, I revisit the history of ideas that informed the American
creation of an independent judiciary equipped with the power of
judicial review.
There is, of course, already an excellent historical literature on
the development of the judiciary as a distinct and independent
source of political authority.4 Much of this literature, however, confines itself, at least primarily, to the origins and evolution of ideas
about the formal separation of institutional powers—looking principally to Montesquieu, John Adams, and their forebears—and considers contemporary historical conceptions of popular sovereignty
only incidentally. Likewise, there is a robust and fascinating literature on the history, theory, and practice of popular sovereignty in
early America. Though much of this work touches upon the separation of powers, there is less sustained attention to the substantial
role that conceptions of institutional structure played in bringing
this foundational political premise to life.5
This article suggests that these two evolving political ideas—
popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—merged in the
making of American judicial power, and that it is impossible fully to
understand the structural function of judicial review without weaving these strands together into an integrated whole. Or, put another way, we must expand the traditional conception of the
“separation of powers” to include not just distinct institutional
functions, but also the structured division of the sovereign prerogative itself, both within and without the institutions of government.
3. See Maggie Haberman, Trump’s Brand of Law and Order Leaves Leeway
on the Law, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2017), https://nyti.ms/3lCCGXj [https://perma.cc/
6PVV-U5KW]; see also Elliot Hanon, Trump Expected to Defy Supreme Court and
Announce Executive Action on Census Citizenship Question, SLATE (July 11, 2019),
https://bit.ly/36Vywpx [https://perma.cc/MJ2U-HE29]; Adam Liptak, Roberts Rebukes Trump for Swipe at ‘Obama Judge,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2018, at A1.
4. See generally, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008);
SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: 1606–1787 (2011);
SCOTT GORDON, CONTROLLING THE STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM ANCIENT
ATHENS TO TODAY (1999); KURT VON FRITZ, THE THEORY OF THE MIXED CONSTITUTION IN ANTIQUITY (1975); M. J. C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967); E.G. PANAGOPOULOS, ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY
AND MEANING OF CHECKS AND BALANCES (1985); CHARLES MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN (2010); EUGENE V. ROSTOW, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAW (1963);
HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION (1983).
5. Scott Gordon’s excellent book comes perhaps the closest to weaving these
political ideas together into a coherent whole. See GORDON, supra note 4, at
19–51. His work is not focused directly on judicial power, however.
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With this in mind, we must read Jean Bodin, Locke, and Wilson
alongside Aristotle, the English Civil War theorists, Blackstone,
and the Federalists. Once this marriage is made, it becomes evident
that the institutional separation of judicial power provides the necessary architecture for an American practice of popular sovereignty, and it is together that these intellectual traditions
underwrite our constitutional commitment to the rule of law.
With these theoretical threads spun together across time, Article III becomes part of a larger effort to unbundle the metaphorical
sticks of traditional sovereign power, and to vest what I call the
revolutionary prerogative in an independent judicial branch. This
prerogative establishes an institutional form through which the
Court might invoke Locke’s famous “revolution principle” on behalf of the sovereign People. It thus allows for what James Wilson
celebrated—and what Sir William Blackstone could not conceive—
the possibility of legalized revolution.6 In other words, the revolutionary prerogative allows for formal, independent appeal of the
terms of the constitutional contract, by which the People delegated
limited authority to their legislative and executive agents. Indeed,
it is the final legal step before constitutional amendment or
dissolution.
While Professor McConnell was able to undertake a blow-byblow examination of the text and commentary of the founding to
reveal the redistribution of prerogatives between executive and legislative institutions, there is very little similar record to exploit regarding the nature of the sovereign authority delegated to the third
branch. Thus, this article turns to an older intellectual history of
political writings, and concludes that the revolutionary prerogative—the discretion to declare the “law of the land” as against political officials—came in America to belong to an independent
judicial branch.7 The People and the President retain a concurrent
6. See discussion infra notes 328–332 and accompanying text.
7. To be quite clear, then, I do not explore the “original meanings”—public,
intended, expected, or otherwise—of Article III. As Gordon Wood and many
others have pointed out, there was a broad diversity of opinion on the propriety of
judicial review at the founding. Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review
Revisited, Or How the Marshall Court Made More Out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 787 (1999). And certainly, many founders, notably Jefferson and Madison,
rejected claims that the Court had exclusive power to interpret the Constitution.
Id. at 795–96. This, then, is not an “originalist” paper in the parlance of our times.
Rather, I attempt to use intellectual historical sources to better understand the
structural relationships (intended, expected, or otherwise) that our written Constitution establishes between the People, Congress, the President, and the Court.
Further, I make no claim here about particular applications of this intellectual history to any modern legal controversies. In that sense, I am interested only in the
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prerogative of final appeal in non-constitutional cases (through jury
nullification and the pardon power), but even a pardon cannot alter
the judiciary’s determination of constitutional meaning.8 Just because the President has set Sheriff Joe Arpaio free does not render
his actions in office constitutional. Of course, the People retain the
ultimate sovereign prerogative of constitutional amendment or dissolution, but once constituted, the meaning of our fundamental law
remains firmly, and solely, a matter of judicial discretion.9
I. TWO ENLIGHTENED IDEAS
In the 1600s, as the early triumphs of the scientific method
stirred the dormant European mind, a swell of humanist naturalism
began to wash through the dogmatic corners of academic scholasticism.10 Rapid advances in our ability to understand and to predict
the natural world brought renewed optimism about our capacity to
find order in ancient chaos, and, perhaps, to discover perspicuous
principles upon which to found political institutions grounded in
justice and consent, rather than superstition and fear. In this fertile
ground, modern political theory began to take root: social contract
theorists like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau; structuralists like Contarini, Montesquieu, and Adams; critical humanists like Diderot,
Voltaire, and Hume; and progressives in the mold of Condorcet,
Helvetius, and Godwin—among many others—rubbed intellectual
elbows in a newly scientific academy.11 It is here that the ideas that
shaped the American Constitution began to take on their modern
forms. My object is not to revisit the daunting whole of this blossoming liberalism, but rather to trace the development of two particular constitutional ideas: popular sovereignty and the separation
history of ideas, and decidedly not in discrete modern legal meanings. See Lawrence Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111
(2015); Saul Cornell, Intellectual History as an Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (2013).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871) (addressing the effect of
a pardon on statutory interpretation, but the reasoning applies a fortiori to constitutional interpretation).
9. I thus enter—at least partly—into the current debates over “constitutional
departmentalism” and “judicial supremacy” decidedly in support of the latter position. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, and
the Rule of Law in a Populist Age, 96 TEX. L. REV. 487 (2018) (discussing the
canvassing debate).
10. Humanist naturalism seeks metaphysical answers in empirical observations of the natural world and suggests that human beings have the capacity to
make these discoveries for themselves.
11. For a fascinating take on Enlightenment political theories—and subsequent revisionism—see Peter Gay, The Enlightenment in the History of Political
Theory, 69 POL. SCI. Q. 374, 375–78 (1954).
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of powers. I examine each tradition separately before outlining
how they came together to produce a constitutionally independent
judiciary.
A. Popular Sovereignty
A number of modern scholars—among them Bruce Ackerman,
Akhil Reed Amar, Randy Barnett, and Barry Friedman—have
built more or less comprehensive theories of American constitutionalism around various conceptions of popular sovereignty.12
And, recently, the intellectual history of the doctrine has been the
subject of renewed interest, with important new treatments by
Richard Tuck and Daniel Lee going to press in just the last few
years.13 The basic idea, however, remains fairly straightforward,
even if it was still somewhat radical in the late 18th century. It is
the People, in some form, that retain sovereignty in a constitutional
republic.14 They may, in various ways, authorize public institutions
to exercise certain powers, but they retain the ultimate prerogative
to, as Carl Schmitt would famously put it, “decide[ ] upon the
exception.”15
As with any political theory, of course, the devil is in the details. Who are the People? How can they be both sovereign and
subject? How do they delegate authority? What authority can they
delegate or reserve? How do they exercise their retained prerogative? How do we account for dissent? These and other questions
have puzzled theorists since the early days of the republic—and,
indeed, for centuries before.16 In this section, I trace the basic prin12. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Akhil
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); RANDY
BARNETT, THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE
PEOPLE (2009).
13. See generally, e.g., DANIEL LEE, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN EARLY MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT (2016); POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE (Richard Bourke & Quentin Skinner eds., 2016); RICHARD TUCK,
THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN (2015).
14. See, e.g., JAMES WILSON, Introductory Lecture: Of the Study of the Law in
the United States, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 431, 445–46 (Kermit
Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007) [hereinafter WILSON, Of the Study of the
Law]. Accord JAMES WILSON, State House Yard Speech (Oct. 6, 1787), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra, at 171.
15. On delegated sovereignty, see JAMES WILSON, State House Yard Speech
(Oct. 6, 1787) in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 14, at 171.
On the essence of sovereignty, see CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 19 (George Schwab trans., expanded ed. 2007) (“Sovereign is he who decides
upon the exception.”).
16. Indeed, Edmund Morgan has famously argued that much of the theory
that underwrites the Anglo-American political nomos amounts to “fictional” or
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ciple from its classical roots to the American founding, with an emphasis on the role that judicial institutions play in various
conceptions. I conclude that, on the eve of the American Revolution, the conceptual pieces were available to lodge a legalized
power of revolution in the courts.
1. Aristotle — There will be more to say about Aristotle in discussing the separation of powers, but the Politics deserves at least a
brief mention here, too, if only to establish its influence in the debates to follow.17 Aristotle never developed a discrete theory of
popular sovereignty, but his fundamental ideas about the nature
and purpose of politics undoubtedly laid the foundation for later
work.18 Most salient in this regard are his teleological accounts of
man as the “political animal,” and his assertion that the final cause
of politics is human fulfillment and the good life.19 Though he
never drew it, it is easy to imagine a fairly straight line between
these underlying premises and the conclusion that mankind can,
and must, govern itself. That is, if the purpose of politics is to make
fulfilling lives possible, and if humans are political by nature, then
the state’s very purpose is to give citizens a meaningful role in shaping their own political destinies. Certainly Aristotle shared little of
the modern American optimism about everyone’s ability to understand and practice political virtue, and so we cannot attribute to
him a general theory of popular governance.20 But here at least is
an account of human, rather than divine, political authority—one
which locates at least some of that authority in the will of the governed themselves. In the years to come, as medieval humanists
pushed back against overreaching Papal authority, Aristotle’s ideas
would provide substantial grist for the theoretical mill.
2. Marsilius of Padua — Marsilius was an Italian scholar,
trained as a physician, who would rise to become Rector of the Uni“mythological” kinds of narrative. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE:
THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988).
17. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (C. D. C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1998) (c.
350 B.C.E.) [hereinafter POLITICS].
18. Indeed, it seems that the prevailing modern view considers it “anachronistic” to impute anything like a modern conception of “sovereignty” to the ancient
Greeks. See Kinch Hoekstra, Athenian Democracy and Popular Tyranny, in POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 13, at 15.
19. POLITICS 1. 1252b 30–31 (“[T]he state comes into existence, originating in
the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life.”); id.
at 1253a 2–3 (“Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that
man is by nature a political animal.”).
20. Id. at 1254a 22–23 (“[F]rom the hour of their birth, some are marked out
for subjugation, and others for rule.”).
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versity of Paris in 1313.21 He was a disciple of “the divine Aristotle,” upon whom he relied throughout his efforts to challenge the
Vatican’s temporal authority.22 Marsilius’s great work, Defensor
Pacis, is in large part a theological discourse, but it also establishes
some of the early groundwork for popular sovereignty theory.23
Pointing again and again to Aristotle, Marsilius argued that coercive legal authority ultimately derives from the people themselves:
“[I]t pertains to the whole body of the citizens to generate the form,
that is, the law, according to which all civil acts must be regulated.”24 This “whole body of citizens” he identified as the “primary legislator,” the legislator humanus, which he carefully
distinguished from “the ruler,” or principatus, who must act in “accordance with the form which the legislator has given to him.”25
While this much is roughly consistent with Aristotle, Marsilius
went on to make an even stronger claim: The citizens, themselves,
are in fact the only source of legitimate coercive authority:
The aforesaid whole body of citizens or the weightier part
thereof is the legislator regardless of whether it makes the law
directly by itself or entrusts the making of it to some person or
persons, who are not and cannot be the legislator in the absolute
sense, but only in a relative sense and for a particular time and in
accordance with the authority of the primary legislator.26

Here, then, is the germ of modern popular sovereignty doctrine.
Not only are citizens the source of legitimate coercive power; they
further retain the sovereign prerogative as primary legislator—even
when they delegate certain authority to rulers or government
institutions.
For Marsilius particularly, the important point was that the authority to impose coercive law lies with the People, not the Pope or
his interpretations of divine will.27 Indeed, he argued that the
21. Alan Gewirth, Introduction to MARSILIUS OF PADUA, DEFENSOR PACIS
xix, xix (Alan Gewirth trans., 1967).
22. Id. For the quoted phrase, see MARSILIUS OF PADUA, DEFENSOR PACIS
38 (Alan Gewirth trans., Columbia Univ. Press, 1967) (1324) [hereinafter DEFENSOR PACIS].
23. See generally DEFENSOR PACIS, supra note 22.
24. Id. at 62.
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 45; see also id. at 46 (“[T]he human authority to make laws belongs
only to the whole body of the citizens or the weightier part thereof.”).
27. Generally, the second discourse is a vitriolic protest against the encroachments of Papal authority, which led to Marsilius’s excommunication in 1327.
Serena Ferente, Popolo and Law: Late Medieval Sovereignty in Marsilius and the
Jurists, in POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 18, at
96, 98.
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Church was structurally precluded from playing an active role in
governing temporal affairs.28 Thus, while Marsilius did not hold
modern views about the institutional separation of political powers,
he certainly did suggest that the functions of church and state must
remain separate in fundamental ways.29 This in itself is quite significant, as some see the genesis of modern separation of powers theory in these early efforts to delineate the proper boundaries of
religious and civil authority.30
Marsilius also offered some limited thoughts on judicial power
and its relationship to the sovereign. Certainly, he did not conceive
of an independent or structurally separate judicial branch of the
state. Once the legislator empowers the ruler through law, the latter has univocal authority to carry out his delegated prerogatives—
so long as his actions basically conform to the legislative command.31 But Marsilius was not naive to the fact that the ruler is a
“human being” susceptible to “false opinion[s] or perverted desire[s] or both, as a result of which he comes to do the contraries of
the things determined by the law.”32 This reality requires that “the
ruler is rendered measurable by someone else who has the authority to measure or regulate him.”33 For Marsilius, this must be done
by “the legislator, or by a person or persons appointed for this purpose by the authority of the legislator.”34 He stopped short of calling these appointees “judges”35—they are instead a manifestation
of the People as sovereign legislator—but here at least is an inkling
of the corrective doctrine that would much later become judicial
review.
3. Jean Bodin — While other late medieval scholars—perhaps
most notably John of Segovia—pushed Marsilius’s ideas forward,
the next significant evolution in popular sovereignty theory
emerged from the work of Renaissance philosopher Jean Bodin.36
28. See DEFENSOR PACIS, supra note 22, at 12–27 (quote p. 18).
29. Id. at 17, 20.
30. BERMAN, supra note 4, at 536–37.
31. DEFENSOR PACIS, supra note 22, at 87.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 88.
35. Indeed, there is a strong case to be made that Marsilius saw the ruler as
merely the “judge” of conduct prescribed by the popular legislator. See TUCK,
supra note 13, at 78 (“As far as Marsiglio was concerned the legislator humanus
monopolized legislation, and the principatus was merely a judge . . . .”); accord
ALAN GEWIRTH, MARSILIUS OF PADUA AND MEDIEVAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
234 (1951) (“For Marsilius, political authority is unilinear: it moves in a straight
line from the legislator to the ruler who judges by authority of the legislator . . . .”).
36. For an exceptional treatment of other late medieval sovereignty theorists,
see generally LEE, supra note 13.
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A French lawyer, academic, and magistrate, Bodin came of age during the Reformation, and—like Hobbes after him—he argued that
a strong monarchy provides the best civil protection against factional religiosity and unrest.37 As such, he was an adamant critic of
Aristotle’s mixed regime, particularly inasmuch as it lent support to
Protestant calls for various forms of popular government.38 Presumably this criticism would extend to the Aristotelian Marsilius,
although in truth there is no evidence that Bodin ever read Defensor Pacis.39 Perhaps ironically, however, from these absolutist critiques arose Bodin’s substantial contribution to modern democratic
theory: an explicit distinction between sovereignty and
government.40
Aristotle’s failure to recognize this distinction, Bodin claimed,
led him to conflate the sovereign prerogative with state authority,
thus endowing “the few” and “the many” with a fundamental dominion they did not possess.41 It was a mistake to suppose that
conceding “the right of deliberation about the state . . . even to
private citizens, and the administration of justice to the humblest
man” rendered these actors sovereign.42 To the contrary, this was
clear evidence that such supervisory duties “do not pertain to sovereignty,” but rather to the administration of government.43 To discover the true sovereign power, or summum imperium, we must
instead “investigate who can give authority to magistrates, [and]
who can take it away.”44 This ultimate authority, both “absolute
and perpetual”45 necessarily enjoys “supreme power over citizens
37. This, at least, is the view of Julian Franklin, the leading 20th century Bodin scholar. JULIAN FRANKLIN, JEAN BODIN AND THE RISE OF ABSOLUTIST THEORY (1973); accord, William Dunning, Jean Bodin on Sovereignty, 11 POL. SCI. Q.
82, 87 (1896).
38. TUCK, supra note 13, at 29–30.
39. Id. at 78.
40. JEAN BODIN, THE SIX BOOKS OF A COMMONWEALE (SIX LIVRES DE LA
REPUBLIQUE) 249 (Kenneth D. McRae ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1962) (Richard
Knolles trans., 1606) (1576) [hereinafter REPUBLIQUE]; accord TUCK, supra note
13, at 30. Bodin would label these distinct entities summum imperium and administratio, which “would henceforward remain the standard way of describing the
distinction between the ‘sovereign’ and the ‘government’ in the Latin texts of Renaissance and post-Renaissance Europe.” Id.
41. JEAN BODIN, METHOD FOR THE EASY COMPREHENSION OF HISTORY
(METHODUS AD FACILEM HISTORIARUM) 156 (Beatrice Reynolds trans., W.W.
Norton & Co. 1969) [hereinafter METHODUS].
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 178.
45. JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY 1 (Julian H. Franklin trans. & ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (assembling selections from the REPUBLIQUE) [hereinafter BODIN: ON SOVEREIGNTY].
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and subjects, unrestrained by laws.”46 And it is only by identifying
the locus of this power—in which Aristotle had failed—that we can
properly identify the nature of a particular state:
[The sovereignty] distinction nonetheless seems to me more than
necessary, for the good understanding the state of every commonwealth, if a man will not cast himself headlong into an infinite labyrinth of errors, where into which we see Aristotle
himself to have fallen, mistaking the popular commonwealth for
the aristocratic one and vice versa; . . . From this error likewise is
sprung the opinion of them which have forged a form of commonwealth mingled of all three types . . . .47

By “absolute,” Bodin meant, among other things, that the sovereign power is indivisible, although this did not prevent the sovereign from delegating its authority “in any way it pleased.”48 The
fundamental point was that such delegates remain agents, who can
“never [themselves] be sovereign.”49 Further, the sovereign, as
principal, retains the right to reclaim its delegated authority at any
time.50 This, in turn, is the significance of the “perpetual” nature of
sovereign authority—as opposed to the agencies of government,
whose “grasp on such extraordinary power is always temporary and
tenuous.”51 While Bodin’s intention may have been to defend the
ultimate authority of the French monarchy against the Estates-General, he had no theoretical objection to the possibility of a popular
or democratic sovereign.52 Again, the critical insight is the principal-agency relationship between the sovereign and its delegated officers, an idea Bodin found rooted in the Roman civil law
tradition.53 Those that followed Bodin’s lead—particularly the
German Christopher Besoldus—would analogize this relationship
46. Dunning, supra note 37, at 92.
47. REPUBLIQUE, supra note 40, at 249–50 (archaic usages modernized).
48. For the quotation, see LEE, supra note 13, at 195. In the Methodus, Bodin
outlined five essential features or “marks” of sovereignty:
One . . . is creating the most important magistrates and defining the office
of each one; the second, proclaiming and annulling laws; the third, declaring war and peace; the fourth, receiving final appeal from all magistrates;
the last, the power of life and death when the law itself leaves no room
for extenuation or grace.
METHODUS, supra note 41 at 172–73.
49. LEE, supra note 13, at 199 (“[T]he main point that Bodin wanted to stress
was the incompatibility of sovereignty and agency . . . .”).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. TUCK, supra note 13, at 50. Tuck notes that Bodin was, however, hostile
to the idea of a democratic government, which might easily descend into
demagoguery.
53. LEE, supra note 13, at 200–05.
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to the distinction between “real” and “personal” property: “real”
or immovable sovereignty lies with the principal, who may delegate
temporary “personal” sovereignty to his agents.54 In future years,
this “real-personal” distinction would become an essential feature
of evolving popular sovereignty theory—one that English theorist
George Lawson, among others, would adopt in the aftermath of the
English Civil War.55
Perhaps just as interesting, for present purposes, are Bodin’s
efforts to explain the peculiar intermediary authority of the French
Parlements, particularly in their role as the nation’s highest
courts.56 By Bodin’s reckoning, such bodies—while certainly not
sovereign—could bind the king to his promises as a matter of duty:
[A] sovereign prince is bound by the contracts he has made,
whether with his subject or with a foreigner . . . . Thus the Parlement of Paris wrote to King Charles IX in March 1563 that his
majesty could not unilaterally break the contract between himself
and the clergy without the clergy’s consent, inasmuch as he had a
duty to give justice . . . . [Likewise, the sovereign] cannot take
away an office he has given to his subject without just cause,
which a private lord can do, as the courts have ordinarily
adjudged.57

Further, there could be no appeal from the judgment of a Parlement sitting as a court—and similar judicial institutions existed in
virtually all European states.58 Taken together, these practices
seemed to suggest: (1) that the sovereign can be bound by some
form of law, in which case, his authority was not absolute; and (2)
that the right of final appeal is not, as was universally supposed,
“one of the principal rights of sovereignty.”59
Bodin’s response to these suggestions was to argue: (1) that
sovereign promises (even contracts) are not enforceable as a matter
of law, but rather as a matter of obligation; and that (2) in every
54. See, e.g., JULIAN H. FRANKLIN, JOHN LOCKE AND THE THEORY OF SOV64–68 (1978) (discussing the distinction’s emergence and use among
post-Bodinian thinkers).
55. Id.; see also infra notes 224–50 and accompanying text.
56. See TUCK supra note 13, at 59–61.
57. BODIN: ON SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 45, at 35. See also, LEE, supra note
13, at 213 (“[W]hile the sovereign authority may be exempt from its own laws,
legibus solutus, it is not exempt from its contractual obligations, especially where
those obligations arise from legal grants of office to magistrates.”).
58. BODIN: ON SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 45, at 68 (“[I]n every state one finds
courts and Parlements that judge without appeal, such as the eight Parlements of
France, the four Courts in Spain, the Imperial Chamber in Germany, the Council
at Naples, the Rota at Rome, and the senate at Milan.”).
59. Id. at 67, 69.
EREIGNTY
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state there remains an implied right of civil petition to the sovereign, even following the judgment of the highest court.60 Nonetheless, he understood, as Richard Tuck has put it, that the “balance
between King and Parlements could not be expressed by saying that
the Parlements were agents of the King, because the whole point of
the system is that they were not.”61 Thus, Bodin developed a theory of “constituted magistrates,” whereby some legally established
officers entered into a “binding bilateral obligation” with the sovereign.62 In Daniel Lee’s words,
On the one hand, [such a] magistrate is bound by his obligation
to the sovereign, as a sort of “borrower” of the public office and
its imperium, to exercise it in good faith as well as to lay down
and return the office to the sovereign upon completion of his legally specified term of office. Yet, so too is the sovereign bound
by an obligation to the magistrate, by a duty of non-interference.
In a government where offices are constituted by the law, the
sovereign authority must not interfere in the affairs of the magistrate or remove the magistrate without cause.63

With these efforts to work out the nature of delegated sovereign
authority, Bodin helped bring about another important development in the intellectual history of independent judicial power.
4. The Social Contract: Hobbes & Locke — Bodin’s sovereignty distinction initially met with some resistance on the European continent, particularly in the work of Hugo Grotius and
Samuel Pfufendorf.64 In England, however, where the Republique
was translated and printed in 1606, Bodin’s ideas undoubtedly
brought some comfort to a young Thomas Hobbes.65 Born as the
Spanish Armada approached the island in 1588, and raised during
the ensuing religious wars, he would later recall (in autobiographical verse), “hereupon it was my Mother Dear, Did bring forth
Twins at once, both Me, and Fear.”66 For the young Oxford student, Bodin’s prescription for religious and civil unrest—a supreme
60. Id. at 35–36, 69–70. “Obligation” arises from the law of nature or God,
not the laws of men, from which the sovereign is exempt. Id.
61. TUCK, supra note 13, at 61.
62. LEE, supra note 13, at 213.
63. Id.
64. TUCK, supra note 13, at 63–64.
65. LEE, supra note 13, at 306. For a rich account of the larger shift from the
mythology of “divine right” to the narrative of the “popular sovereign” as a stabilizing ethos, see MORGAN, supra note 16, at 88–93.
66. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LIFE OF THOMAS HOBBES OF MALMESBURY,
WRITTEN HIMSELF IN A LATINE POEM, AND NOW TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH 2
(1680).
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and indivisible sovereign—must have struck a soothing chord. And
in his efforts to account for how such a sovereign might come into
being, Hobbes brought an old political idea to bear: the social
contract.
Hobbes’s ideas placed him somewhere between the opposing
sides in the English Civil War—discussed in depth below—which
dominated national politics during his later life. Unlike the Royalists, he rejected sovereignty by divine right (at least in a Christian
nation), but he also rejected the Parliamentarian’s view of a shared
legislative prerogative.67 Instead, he envisioned a powerful absolute monarch—in the best Bodinian tradition—which derived her
sovereignty not from God, but from an original contract with the
people.68 In fleshing out the nuances and entailments of this contract, Hobbes drew a careful, and crucial, distinction between potentially ambiguous references to the “the people.” To be precise
there are the “People,” and the “people”—the former are sovereign, while the latter are subjects:
Whenever we say that a People or a number of men is willing,
commanding or doing something, we mean a commonwealth
which is commanding, willing and acting through the will of one
man or through the wills of several men who are in agreement
. . . . But whenever something is said to be done by a number of
men, great or small, without the will of [the sovereign] man or
meeting, it means it was done by a people as subjects, that is by
many individual citizens.69

The sovereign, or the commonwealth, is thus univocal, even when it
embodies the will of the People. Anything less than total unity is
simply not sovereign authority, merely the multitudinous opinion of
the subject citizenry.
Hobbes recognized that a large group of people cannot actually speak as one, and so the unity he described is possible only
through representation.70 Sovereignty, he insisted, is an abstract or
“artificial” concept, which cannot become tangible until made man67. For an excellent and thought-provoking account of Hobbes’s relationship
to his contemporary theorists, see Eleanor Curran, A Most Peculiar Royalist: Hobbes in the Context of His Political Contemporaries, 10 BRITISH J. HIST. PHIL. 167
(2002).
68. THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE, Ch. 5, §§ V–IX (1651).
69. LEE, supra note 13, at 310 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE, Ch. 6,
§ 1).
70. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN I, 16, 14, 104 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett
1994) (1651) (“And because the multitude is not one, but many . . . every man
giv[es] their common representer authority from himself in particular, and own[s]
all the actions the representer doth.”) [hereinafter LEVIATHAN].
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ifest in a person or institution.71 We then imagine this person or
institution as a “representation” of the sovereign will.72 The original covenant among the People brings this person or institution to
life as the sovereign spirit instantiated, so resolving the apparent
paradox in the (in)famous claim that, “the King is the people.”73
Perfect sovereign unity is thus a feature not of the represented, but
of the representative.74 For Hobbes, of course, the best system of
government is one in which the People give their unconditional and
irrevocable sovereign consent to an absolute monarch, though he
seemingly did not foreclose the possibility that sovereignty might be
lodged—even temporarily or contingently—in democratic sorts of
institutions.75
Hobbes’s insistence on complete sovereign unity, however,
would prevent him from signing on to Marsilius’s or Bodin’s
fledgling ideas about courts and judicial review or constraint. Indeed, in a famous passage he explicitly rejected the idea of binding
the sovereign to law, or of any appeal to the courts taken over the
sovereign’s head:
For to be subject to the laws is to be subject to the commonwealth, that is, to the sovereign representative, that is, to himself,
which is not subjection, but freedom from the laws. Which error,
because it setteth the laws above the sovereign, setteth also a
judge above him, and a power to punish him, which is to make a
new sovereign; and, again, for the same reason a third, to punish
the second; and so continually without end, to the confusion and
dissolution of the commonwealth.76

To empower a court to review sovereign action, in other words, simply transforms that court into the sovereign, and so on. To end this
71. Id. at 3 [Introduction] (“For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN
called a COMMONWEALTH . . . which is but an artificial man . . . in which the
sovereignty is an artificial soul . . .”); accord LEE, supra note 13, at 311.
72. Professor Lee emphasizes the deeply interesting point that “representation” in this sense “is not so much mimetic, but actively imaginative as in drama
and liturgy.” LEE, supra note 13, at 312.
73. LEVIATHAN, supra note 70, at I, 16, 13 (“A multitude are made one person, when they are by one man, or by one person, represented so that it be done
with the consent of everyone of that multitude in particular.”). For the quotation,
see LEE, supra note 13, at 311 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE, Ch. 12, § 8).
74. LEVIATHAN, supra note 70, at I, 16, 13 (“For it is the unity of the of the
representer, not the unity of the represented that maketh the person one. . . . [A]nd
unity cannot otherwise be understood in multitude.”).
75. Richard Tuck is perhaps the most prominent advocate of this view. See,
e.g., Richard Tuck, Hobbes and Democracy, in RETHINKING THE FOUNDATIONS OF
MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (Annabel Brett, James Tully & Holly HamiltonBleakley eds. 2006).
76. LEVIATHAN, supra note 70, at II, 29, 9, 213 (emphasis in original).
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regression, Hobbes argued, we must declare that the sovereign is
above the law—the power that makes the law cannot, by definition,
be bound by it. And it was in response to these claims, as much as
anything, that John Locke would make his most important contributions to liberalizing popular sovereignty theory.
Locke accepted Hobbes’s social contract framework, but he
envisioned the terms of the original agreement quite differently.
Because God endowed us all with certain natural rights—at the
very least, life itself—there are some powers we simply cannot consent away: “[F]or, as hath been said, no Man can, by agreement,
pass over to another that which he hath not in himself, a Power over
his own life.”77 Thus, even as we enter political society we must
hold in reserve those fundamental dignities that belong properly to
God, with which we have no right or power to bargain.78 For this
reason, Locke utterly rejected Sir Robert Filmer’s absolutist
claims—which went beyond even Hobbes’s—suggesting that supreme and unconditional monarchy is “the only Government in the
World.”79 With this rejection, Locke took a critical step forward in
the western conception of limited government.
Locke argued that the concept of absolute monarchy is utterly
inconsistent with our very reasons for entering into the social contract in the first place—and “so can be no form of Civil Government at all.”80 He imagined a state of nature considerably milder
than Hobbes’s, which in turn presented different motivations for
entering into society.81 Rather than fear, the primary contractual
incentive is the need for the neutral third-party appeal of property
grievances.82 The sorts of absolute monarchy Filmer and Hobbes
advocated permitted appeal of such disputes “that may happen betwixt the Subjects themselves,” but offered no recourse for grievances against the sovereign itself.83 Such grievances might
nonetheless be justified, Locke maintained, on grounds of the inalienable natural rights—notably private property—reserved from

77. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT II.4.24 285 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1689).
78. Id.
79. Id. at II.7.90 326.
80. Id.
81. Id. at II.4–6 269–71.
82. On neutral appeal as “the end of Civil Society,” see id. at II.7.90 326. On
property rights as the primary motivation, see id. at II.7.84 329 (“[W]hereas Government has no other end but the preservation of Property . . . “).
83. Id. at II.7.93 328.
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the original contract.84 It was therefore absurd to imagine people
entering into a covenant that failed to provide this basic protection:
As if when Men quitting the State of Nature entered into Society,
they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the restraint of Laws, but that he should still retain all the Liberty of
the State of Nature, increased with Power, and made Licentious
by Impunity. This is to think that Men are so foolish that they
take care to avoid what Mischiefs may be done to them by PoleCats, or Foxes, but are content, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by Lions.85

At first blush, this seems to suggest that a correct account of
the original social contract must provide for some division of the
traditional sovereign prerogative. That is, if the very purpose of the
agreement is to establish a neutral appeal, including upon matters
of inalienable right, then the contract itself must be appealable to a
third party.86 Here, however, Locke hedged his institutional bets.
This ultimate appeal, he reasoned, must be made to God—who of
course retains her own prerogative—through the political mechanism that Hobbes feared most: revolution.87 Thus, the sovereign
prerogative is never actually divided; it remains wholly with the
People themselves, not their representative, at all times.
Locke did his best, however, to reassure readers that such revolutions must be rare and, perhaps more importantly, sanctioned in
heaven.88 The very possibility of such revolt, however, should serve
as a warning and corrective to the wise prince, who would do well
not to abuse the authority entrusted to him.89 For if government
should breach its delegated trust, law-making authority must necessarily revert to its sovereign source:
[W]hen by the Miscarriages of those in Authority, [the Legislative power] is forfeited; upon the forfeiture of their Rulers . . . it
reverts to the Society, and the People have a Right to act as Supreme, and continue the Legislative in themselves, or erect a new
Form, or under the old form place it in new hands, as they think
good.90
84. An arrangement that stripped a man of these rights without recourse
would render him the “Slave of an Absolute Prince,” and, recall, we have no right
to sell our God-given lives into slavery. Id. at II.7.92 327.
85. Id. at II.7.93 328 (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at II.29.222 412–13.
87. See id. at II, 14, 168, 379; II, 18, 207, 403–04.
88. See id. at II, 18, 207–09; II, 19, 223–25, 241–42.
89. See id. at II, 18, 209.
90. Id. at II, 19, 243.
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This would become known as the Lockean “revolution principle,”91 and it was just this unhappy condition that Thomas Jefferson
claimed for the American colonists in the opening lines of his revolutionary appeal for independence from Britain.92 And it should
thus be no surprise that the Americans would quickly seize upon
these blossoming notions of liberal popular sovereignty for their
own theoretical and political purposes.
B. Separation of Powers
The idea of dividing political authority among plural governing
institutions has classical roots, but the particular conception underlying the American constitutional doctrine emerged principally
from the English Civil War and the subsequent Restoration.93 It
was this evolving English structure—including efforts to split an independent judicial power away from the traditional executive prerogative—which Montesquieu purported to describe in his 1748
Spirit of the Laws.94 But it was left to John Adams and the Americans to realize these ideas in a written constitutional model rooted
in popular sovereignty.95 One result was an independent judicial
branch vested with the revolutionary prerogative to enforce the
popular sovereign’s expressed will against its government agents.
Rather than organize this discussion around particular individuals,
this section focuses more generally on certain periods of intellectual
development. Of course, a few individuals may dominate discussion of a given period, but my hope is to reveal a fairly coherent
chronological evolution in the theory of the separation of powers,
particularly in the years between the English Civil War and the
American Constitution.
91. See discussion supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
92. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
93. For excellent surveys of this history, see M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967); W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS (1965); WILLIAM BONDY, THE SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS: IN HISTORY, IN THEORY, AND IN THE CONSTITUTIONS (1896);
SCOTT GORDON, CONTROLLING THE STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM FROM ANCIENT
ATHENS TO TODAY (1999); SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL
POWER: THE ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, 1606–1787 (2011); GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD (1997);
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (Richard Bellamy ed.,
2005).
94. See VILE, supra note 93, at 60–63 (discussing work of George Lawson); see
also CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
(Anne Cohler, Basia Miller & Harold Stone eds. & trans., 1989) (1748).
95. E.g., John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in 4 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 193 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1856) [hereinafter Adams, Thoughts on
Government].
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1. The Classical Mixed Regime — Again, we begin with Aristotle, although this time exploring an idea with which he is much
more closely associated: the mixed regime.96 As his political theory was embedded within his general metaphysical and ethical philosophy, it is worth first summarizing a very brief Aristotelian
worldview.
Aristotle’s teleological metaphysics famously center on his four
causes of being: (1) The material; (2) the formal; (3) the efficient;
and (4) the final.97 In the case of a city-state, the material causes
are individual citizens—perhaps organized into households or communities—and the nation’s natural resources.98 The formal cause is
the constitution, which need not be written, but which must provide
“a certain ordering” of political life.99 The efficient cause is the
lawgiver or founder—the “megalopsychos” or “great-souled
man”—which here is the great statesman.100 Most importantly, the
city-state’s final cause is to help bring about the good or noble
life—a notion that pervades much of the Politics.101 In Aristotle’s
political theory, it is the presence or absence of this virtuous purpose that differentiates a healthy constitutional form from its corrupt counterpart.102
Promoting the “good life,” of course, presumes an ethical theory, and here Aristotle built upon the foundations laid in his
Nicomachean Ethics.103 In particular, he returned to earlier discussions of both universal and distributive justice.104 The former requires that the state focus entirely on the “common advantage” of
its citizens, rather than the particular benefit of its rulers.105 The
latter requires that the state bestow benefits on individuals in proportion to their particular merit or desert.106 Consistent with the
virtuous “golden mean,” Aristotle’s state is thus neither wholly an
economic enterprise aimed at wealth maximization, nor wholly de96. See POLITICS, supra note 17.
97. See ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS A.2 (C .D. C. Reeve trans., 2016) (c. 350
B.C.E.).
98. See POLITICS, III, 1, 1274a, 38–41; VII, 14, 1325b, 38–41.
99. Id. at III, 1, 1274b, 32–41.
100. See id. at II, 12, 1273b, 32–33; VII, 4, 1325b, 40–1326a, 5 (likening the
founder or lawgiver to a craftsman).
101. See, e.g., id. at III, 6, 1278b, 17–24; III, 9, 1280b, 39; VII, 2, 1325a, 7–10.
102. See id. at III, 6, 1279a, 17–21.
103. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 2d ed. 1999) (c. 350 B.C.E.)[hereinafter Ethics].
104. Id. at V, 1, 1129b, 11–19; V, 3.
105. POLITICS, supra note 17, at III, 12, 1282b, 16–17.
106. See id. at III, 9, 1280a, 7–22.
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voted to maximizing social equality and individual liberty.107
Rather, in a kind of dialectic, it demands a virtuous dedication to
bringing about the good life for the whole, and it rewards with
wealth, honor and status those who actively demonstrate this
virtue.108
With these foundations in place, Aristotle famously posited six
possible types of government, which correspond to the virtuous and
deviant rule of three possible governors: the one, the few, and the
many.109 The rule of one may consist in a “king” or a “tyrant.” The
few may constitute a virtuous “aristocracy” or a deviant “oligarchy,” while the many may form a virtuous “constitutional government” or a deviant “democracy.”110 Virtue or deviance in turn
depends upon the ruler’s dedication to universal and distributive
justice. Thus, for example, a monarch devoted to the common advantage, who bestows benefits based on virtuous desert, is a “king,”
while one who serves his own interests and practices cronyism is a
“tyrant.”111 A city-state may assume any of these forms, but the
best government will always be one in which “the best men” are at
the helm.112
Aristotle was practical enough to recognize, however, that virtuous statesmen will not always occupy government offices. He was
therefore at some pains to describe the political structure best calculated to ameliorate the destructive tendencies of faction. In an
insight that presaged James Madison by two millennia,113 Aristotle
suggested that a “mixed regime,” wherein class interests might offset one another, provides the best such protection.114 This is realized when both the “few” and the “many” share in the offices of
power, manifesting some alloyed version of oligarchy and democracy.115 Aristotle called this form of government a “polity,” and it
again represents a kind of mean between potential extremes.116
Particularly in a community with a large middle class, Aristotle saw
this division of authority as the scheme most likely to blunt the radical edges of factional avarice.117
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
POLITICS
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id. at III, 9, 1280a, 39–40; 1281a, 1–7.
Id. at III, 7.
Id.
See id. at III, 7–8.
Id. at III, 18.
See Peter Simpson, Aristotle’s Regime of the Americans, in ARISTOTLE’S
TODAY 109, 109–27 (Lenn E. Goodman & Robert B. Talisse eds., 2007).
See POLITICS, supra note 17, at IV, 11.
See id. at IV, 8–9
See id. at IV, 9, 1294a, 30; IV, 11, 1295b, 1–5.
See id. at IV, 11, 1295b, 34–40; 1296a, 1–20.
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The Politics, then, clearly conceives the benefit of dividing political power among competing institutions, but this division is decidedly not an American style separation of powers. Aristotle’s
separation corresponds to class interests, not to the particular functions of any government office or authority, and is thus more akin
to Federalist 10 than to Federalist 45.118 Although he recognized
the existence of diverse political functions, including the judicial
power, he did not argue for any particular institutional division
along these lines.119 He therefore was not an early advocate of an
independent judiciary. Nonetheless, in Aristotle we find a political
science built in part around the principles of dividing, and thus tempering, political power. In this larger sense, he undoubtedly had a
profound influence on the evolution of constitutional structure.
Several centuries later, the Greek historian Polybius would describe Roman efforts to put these principles into practice in his influential and enduring Histories.120 Indeed, Polybius went beyond
Aristotle to argue that the best constitution is a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and the people.121 This happy circumstance he
claimed for Rome:
The three kinds of government . . . were all found united in the
commonwealth of Rome. And so even was the balance between
them all, and so regular the administration that resulted from
their union, that it was no easy thing, even for the Romans themselves, to determine with assurance, whether the entire state was
to be esteemed an aristocracy, a democracy, or a monarchy.122

In the Consuls, Polybius saw elements of monarchy, and in the Senate the hallmarks of aristocracy.123 The People and their Tribunes,
too, had such a “share . . . in the administration of affairs” that one
might consider the state democratic.124 Though he undoubtedly
idealized the Roman constitution, Polybius’s description of its struc-

118. See id. at IV, 11, 1295b, 1–33.
119. See id. at VI, 1, 1317a, 3–9.
120. See POLYBIUS, THE GENERAL HISTORY OF POLYBIUS (Mr. Hampton
trans., 3d. ed. 1773). For excellent treatments of Polybius and his thought, see
FRANK WALBANK, POLYBIUS (1972); KURT VON FRITZ, THE MIXED GOVERNMENT
IN ANTIQUITY, supra note 4; BRIAN C. MCGING, POLYBIUS’ HISTORIES (Oxford
Univ. Press 2010).
121. See POLYBIUS, supra note 120.
122. Id. at VI, 2, 28.
123. See id. at VI, 2, 22.
124. Id.
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ture, and the particular benefits thus derived, became mandatory
reading for future theorists up to and including John Adams.125
In particular, Polybius explored, as Aristotle had not, the specific powers that each part of the Roman regime exercised in government.126 The Consuls—the absolute military leaders in the
field—also enjoyed substantial civil authority while in Rome: “For
all other magistrates, the Tribunes alone excepted, are subject to
them and bound to obey their commands.”127 They summoned the
Senate and popular assemblies and carried out their decisions and
decrees, and they could draw funds from the treasury to meet their
personal needs.128 The Senate controlled all other spending, conducted criminal investigations, issued laws and decrees, and exercised extensive control in foreign policy matters.129 It also
controlled the purse strings while the Consuls conducted war, and
could terminate or continue a Consul’s command on a yearly basis.130 Finally, the people exercised control of elections and the law
courts, decided matters of war and peace, and had final approval
over laws and peace treaties.131
There is fairly robust scholarly debate about the accuracy of
Polybius’s descriptions,132 but there is little doubt about his influence on future theorists. Again, like Aristotle, Polybius described a
political structure divided by class, not by function.133 John Adams
clearly recognized this distinction, and so expressly read these classical writers as a complement to the English Civil War theorists discussed below.134 With that said, Polybius did take particular care to
describe the people’s role in judicial affairs—hearing all capital and
many lesser trials—and their representative Tribunes’ power to
veto Senate proceedings.135 While it is probably a stretch to claim
that Adams found here an embryonic theory of judicial power,
there is no doubt that Polybius’s description of overlapping and di125. Gilbert Chinard, Polybius and the American Constitution, 1 J. HIST.
IDEAS 38, 43–44 (1940).
126. See POLYBIUS, supra note 120, at 28–33.
127. Id. at 23.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 24–25.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See generally MCGING, supra note 120.
133. Id.
134. See JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES, V, I, 176 (1778) (Lawbook Exchange 2001) (“We may be
convinced that the constitution of England . . . is a system far more perfect.”)
[hereinafter ADAMS].
135. See generally MCGING, supra note 120.
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vided powers profoundly influenced the American’s larger constitutional thought.136
During the Enlightenment, the Venetian constitution also took
on a kind of mythical status in theoretical circles—due in no small
part to Gasparo Contarini’s 15th century De Magistratibus et
Republica Venetorium.137 Translated into Italian, French, and English, this treatise became required reading for political theorists
across Europe and in America.138 In it, Contarini repeatedly described the city’s mixed regime in musical terms:
[It is] not unlike to a well-tuned dyapson in musicke, where the
base is to the treble aptly proportioned, carrying with it the shew
of a Monarchie, hath notwithstanding a correspondency with the
popular government, and finally a middle fort of Magistrates being between them both interposed, doth grow (as it were) into a
well concenting harmony of an excellent commonwealth.139

Like Polybius, to whom he often referred, Contarini’s account is, in
Elisabeth Gleason’s words, “neither a faithful portrait nor a utopian
tract, but a combination of the actual and the ideal, the descriptive
and the prescriptive.”140 Perhaps most importantly, however, Contarini presented the checks and balances of Venice’s mixed regime
at least partly in terms of competing political ambitions.141
To this end, the Venetian constitution was structured to give as
many people as possible a sense of ownership, power, and prestige.142 Contarini thus claimed that each part of government—the
monarchical Doge, the aristocratic Senate, and the democratic
Great Council—could make a certain “shew” of political authority.143 In this way, not only did competing offices hold each other in
136. See ADAMS, supra note 134, at V, I, 171–76 (recounting in depth Polybius’s account of the mixed Roman regime).
137. See GASPARO CONTARINI, THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VENICE (Lewes Lewkenor trans., Edmund Matter 1599) (1543). On Contarini’s biography, see ELISABETH G. GLEASON, GASPARO CONTARINI: VENICE,
ROME, AND REFORM (1993). For an excellent overview, see WILLIAM J. BOUWSMA, VENICE AND THE DEFENSE OF REPUBLICAN LIBERTY (1968); Elisabeth G.
Gleason, Reading Between the Lines of Gasparo Contarini’s Treatise on the Venetian State, 15 HIST. REFLECTIONS, Spring 1988, at 251, 252.
138. See GLEASON, supra note 137, at 251.
139. CONTARINI, supra note 137, at 36.
140. GLEASON, supra note 137, at 113.
141. See GORDON, supra note 93, at 221.
142. See CONTARINI, supra note 137, at 33 (“[T]he offices are so divided
among the citizens, that . . . every family & kindred may be pertaker of the publicke honors and offices.”).
143. See id. at 35 (“Whereby you may plainly perceive, that in this manner of
our government there is mingled with a popular shew, the forme of a nobler rule,
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check, but enough citizens felt invested in the state to provide a
sense of legitimacy and forestall large scale unrest.144 Thus, Contarini was more pragmatic and overtly concerned with practical
politics than his Greek predecessors. As Scott Gordon observes, he
was “not anxious to press the institutions of the Venetian state into
the traditional Aristotelian taxonomy. His analysis is carried out in
terms of a different conception—the notion of checks and balances.”145 And it was in part this focus that allowed English theorists to begin to see “mixed government” as “divided government”:
that is, specifically to contemplate a division of institutional functions rather than a structured representation of class interests.
2. The English Civil War — The English Civil War and its aftermath produced the ideas that became the direct antecedents of
the American doctrine of separation of powers.146 It was during
and after the contest between the Stuart King Charles I and Parliament that English theorists began to clarify the distinctions between
executive and legislative power, and began to carve judicial authority away from both—all against the backdrop of emerging popular
sovereignty theories. Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the importance of this period in the intellectual development of Anglo-American constitutionalism.147 Before delving into these ideas in detail,
fed with such temperature that the fame doth not exceed nor go beyond the mean
& manner of popular authority.”).
144. See id. at 32–33 (“[T]hrough too much greatness of power [the few]
might become disturbers or oppressors of the commonwealth: and on the other
side, [if the many] find themselfes voide and hopelesse of honour and government,
might grow into a dislike and hatred of the same.”).
145. GORDON, supra note 93, at 161. For representative passages, see CONTARINI, supra note 137, at 33–35.
146. For an excellent overview of this period, see MARK KISHLANSKY, A
MONARCHY TRANSFORMED: BRITAIN 1603-1714 (1996). See also S. R. GARDINER,
THE HISTORY OF THE GREAT CIVIL WAR VOLS. 1-4 (1883); BLAIR WORDEN, THE
ENGLISH CIVIL WARS: 1640-1660 (2009); G.E. AYLMER, REBELLION OR REVOLUTION? ENGLAND 1640-60 (1986); J.P. KENYON, THE CIVIL WARS OF ENGLAND
(1988); THE NATURE OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION (J.S. Morrill ed., 1993);
GEORGE BURTON ADAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1921); F.W.
MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1908); GOLDWIN
SMITH, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1990); G.P
GOOCH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH DEMOCRATIC IDEAS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1927); MARGARET A. JUDSON, THE CRISIS OF THE CONSTITUTION: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND 1603-1645
(1949); T.C. PEASE, THE LEVELLER MOVEMENT: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF THE ENGLISH GREAT CIVIL WAR (1916); EDWARD JENKS,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH 1649-1660 (1890);
DAVID HUME, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, VOLS. 5 & 6 (William B. Todd ed.,
Liberty Fund 1983) (1761).
147. KISHLANSKY, supra note 146, at 4–5. Edmund Morgan vividly recounts
the importance of this legacy to the American model. See generally MORGAN,
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however, it is worth very briefly summarizing the events that we
have come to call the English Civil War.
Charles I ascended to the throne in 1625 and was quickly at
odds with Parliament.148 Steeped in the doctrine of divine right and
royal prerogative, Charles chafed at the assembly’s control over the
treasury, and in 1629 he dissolved the body altogether.149 For the
next decade, he resorted to unorthodox and unpopular taxation
schemes during the period known as the Eleven Year Tyranny.150
By 1640, low on funds and facing a religious uprising in Scotland,
Charles reconvened Parliament, but dismissed it just three months
later when leadership criticized his policies.151 With the aptly
named “Short” Parliament dissolved, military matters worsened in
the north, and a desperate Charles was forced to call a new assembly, which would sit for the next twenty years.152
This “Long” Parliament immediately introduced reform measures, including a provision for regular assembly and a prohibition
on the King’s power to dissolve the body without its consent.153
Notably, it also abolished the King’s prerogative courts—including
the infamous Star Chamber—citing arbitrary abuses of power.154
Charles reluctantly agreed to these changes, but when Parliament
also forced him to sign an act of attainder for the execution of the
Earl of Strafford—his close adviser and confidant—the King began
to prepare for war.155 In 1642, Charles marched on Westminster in
a failed attempt to arrest five leading members.156 He then withdrew to Oxford and the period of official civil war began.157
supra note 16, at 94–120. There is, however, at least one fairly recent account that
grossly underestimates the English Civil War’s importance in the shift from the
“mixed regime” to modern separation of powers theory. See Steven G. Calabresi,
Mark E. Berghausen & Skylar Albertson, The Rise and Fall of the Separation of
Powers, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 527, 531–35 (2012) (attributing shift from “mixed
regime” to separation of powers theory primarily to “Enlightenment” and American Revolution).
148. 5 HUME, supra note 146, at 165–66.
149. Id. at 217.
150. GOLDWIN SMITH, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 322–23 (1990).
151. MATTHEW A. PAULEY, ATHENS, ROME, AND ENGLAND: AMERICA’S
CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE 169–70 (2011).
152. SMITH, supra note 150, at 322–28.
153. Triennial Act, 16 Cha. 1 c. 1 (1641), https://bit.ly/3dgccYA [https://
perma.cc/94VJ-L9BV].
154. Habeas Corpus Act of 1640, 16 Car. 1 c. 10 (1640).
155. 5 HUME, supra note 146, at 325; SMITH, supra note 150, at 327–29.
156. SMITH, supra note 150, at 330.
157. Id. at 330–31.
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The next few years saw the ancient houses divided into Royalists and Parliamentarians.158 In the early going, Charles had some
military success, but with Scotland’s aid, and under the emerging
leadership of a cavalryman named Oliver Cromwell, Parliament
eventually gained the upper hand.159 Initially, the victorious Parliamentarians hoped to negotiate Charles’s return to a limited role in
government.160 But after a series of intrigues and betrayals, Cromwell’s army purged the assembly of Royalist sympathizers, and the
remaining “Rump” Parliament tried and executed Charles for treason in January of 1649.161
Following his father’s death, Charles II joined Scottish forces in
an attempt to challenge Cromwell’s army.162 With this effort
turned back, however, he went into exile in France.163 After the
Royalists’ defeat, power passed into the hands of Parliament, and
Cromwell assumed control of the army under the title Lord Protector.164 This “Protectorate” lasted until Cromwell’s death in 1658.165
Cromwell’s son, Richard, attempted to assume his father’s title, but
without military support he quickly faltered.166 Parliament then offered Charles II a conditional return to the throne.167 In 1660,
Charles II promised to protect religious liberty and property rights,
and the period known as the Restoration began.168
Charles II presided over an uneasy resettlement period, as he
became increasingly supportive of Catholicism, and so more at odds
with Parliament.169 Upon Charles II’s death in 1684, the crown
passed to his openly Catholic brother James II, which would precipitate the Glorious Revolution and William and Mary’s ascension in
1688.170 In many English and American minds, the end of the Stuart reign finally restored order to the ancient constitution.171 And,
again, it is no exaggeration to say that these events ushered in an
158. Id. at 331–34.
159. Id. at 332–34.
160. 5 HUME, supra note 146, at 505.
161. Id. at 513, 532–40.
162. KISHLANSKY, supra note 146, at 386.
163. Id. at 387.
164. SMITH, supra note 150, at 343.
165. See 6 HUME, supra note 146, at 106–07.
166. Id. at 112–15.
167. Id. at 138–40.
168. Id.
169. See Nathan C. Harkey, The Political Consequences of King Charles II’s
Catholic Sympathies in Restoration England, 6 TENOR OF OUR TIMES 58, 60–62
(2017).
170. SMITH, supra note 150, at 365–68.
171. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC:
1776–1787, 30–31 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter WOOD, CREATION].
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ideological revolution in Western thought about constitutionalism
and the separation of powers.172
Very roughly speaking, this thought developed in three stages.
Much of the early dispute between Charles and Parliament appealed to the ancient constitution and the traditions of a mixed regime.173 Then, with a splintered Parliament assuming ever-greater
power, discussion turned towards restraining both the King and the
assembly, and saw the evolution of a true “separation of powers”
doctrine, with more clearly defined executive and legislative functions.174 Finally, during the Protectorate and Restoration, critical
reflection on the abuses of both the King’s prerogative courts and
parliamentary acts of attainder inspired more developed thought
about a distinct judicial power, and the need for a “balanced constitution” that might better protect the emerging notion of a popular
sovereign.175 Nearly a century later, these ideas would inform
Montesquieu’s famous account of the modern tripartite separation.
Any effort to begin exploring this intellectual history drops us
into the middle of an ongoing conversation, but, for present purposes, there is probably no better place to start than with Charles’s
initial responses to the Long Parliament’s grievances. In June of
1642, parliamentary leaders published The Nineteen Propositions,
which laid out the assembly’s demands of the King.176 Many of
these required Charles to reject Catholicism at home and abroad,
and to educate future generations as Protestants.177 Others, however, directly challenged aspects of the King’s traditional prerogative—by requiring parliamentary approval for royal pardons,
appointing judges, military leaders, and royal councilors; and by
prohibiting the King from removing judges during “good behavior.”178 Significantly, the Propositions also demanded the King’s
assent to the recent Militia Ordinance, which would put the bulk of
the nation’s military forces under Parliament’s command.179
172. See generally R. C. Latham, English Revolutionary Thought, 1640–1660,
30 HISTORY 38 (1945) (recounting blossoming of separation theories).
173. VILE, supra note 93, at 44–47.
174. Id. at 47–49.
175. Id. at 49–50.
176. NINETEEN PROPOSITIONS MADE BY BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, TO
THE KINGS MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTIE (1642), reprinted in 1 THE STRUGGLE FOR
SOVEREIGNTY: SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH POLITICAL TRACTS 145–154
(Joyce Lee Malcolm ed., Liberty Fund 1990) [hereinafter STRUGGLE FOR
SOVEREIGNTY].
177. Id. §§ IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XVII.
178. Id. §§ I, II, III, XII, XIV, XV.
179. Id. § IX.
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Charles promptly offered his Answer to the Nineteen Propositions, which has in time become more famous than the propositions
themselves.180 Authored by two of the King’s more moderate advisers, the Answer began by accusing Parliament of “undermining
the very foundations” of the ancient law:181
[A] new Power hath been assumed to interpret and declare Laws
without Us, by extemporary Votes, without any case judicially
before either house, (which is in effect the same thing as to make
Laws without us) Orders and Ordinances made only by both
houses (tending to a pure Arbitrary power) were pressed upon
the people, as Laws, and their obedience required to them.182

The Answer went onto describe Aristotle’s three forms of government, each burdened with potential “inconveniences.”183 It then
argued that Parliament threatened to destroy the venerable English
mixed regime, and so to reduce the government to deviance and
corruption.184
Significantly, however, the King conceded that his was a coordinate—and thus in some sense an equal—estate of the ancient English constitution.185 This was a momentous concession, as it
seemed to align with the more liberal constitutional ideas of contemporary theorists like Charles Herle and Philip Hunton. Herle, a
Parliamentarian clergyman, used the same language in his public
debate with divine right theorist and royal chaplain, Henry Ferne:
“[In England] the Monarchy, or the highest power is itself compounded of three coordinate Estates, a King, and two Houses of
Parliament.”186 And Hunton—whose A Treatise of Monarchie
tried to claim a theoretical middle ground—likewise argued that
the mixed constitution put “into [Parliament’s] hands a power to
meddle in acts of the highest function of government; a power not
depending on his will, but radically [its] own.”187 In signing on to
180. 1 STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 176, at 146.
181. HIS MAJESTIES ANSWER TO THE NINETEEN PROPOSITIONS OF BOTH
HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, reprinted in 1 STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY (1642),
supra note 176, at 154–78 [hereinafter ANSWER]. The Answer was written by Sir
John Colepepper and Viscount Lucius Cary, who had worked with Parliament the
previous year. 1 STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 176, at 146.
182. ANSWER, supra note 181, at 155.
183. Id. at 167–68.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. CHARLES HERLE, A FULLER ANSWER TO A TREATISE WRITTEN BY
DOCTOR FERNE 2 (London, 1642), https://bit.ly/3nFep4L [https://perma.cc/XUR9S2DC].
187. PHILIP HUNTON, A TREATISE OF MONARCHIE, Pt. II, Chap. 3, Sec. 1
(1643).
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something like this position, then, Charles, or at least his advisors,
seemed willing to concede a coordinate status with the other estates
in order to preserve the monarchy against more radical parliamentary voices.
The Answer is remarkable, too, in its Polybian effort to delineate the particular powers held in each estate. Entrusted to the King
were:
[T]he Power of Treaties of War and Peace, of making Peers, of
chusing Officers and Councellors for State, Judges for Law, Commanders for Forts and Castles, Commissions for raising men for
War abroad, or to prevent or provide against Invasions or Insurrections at home, benefit of Confiscations, power of pardoning,
and some more of the like . . . .188

The House of Commons provided a popular check, so that “the
Prince may not make use of this high and perpetuall power to the
hurt of those for whose good he hath it.”189 Commons was, however, “never intended for any share in Government, or the chusing
of them that shall govern,” but rather was “solely intrusted with the
first Propositions concerning the Levies of Moneys, and the Impeaching of those who . . . have violated the law.”190 The House of
Lords, in turn enjoyed something like the judicial authority, being
“trusted with a Judicatory power, [as] an excellent Screen and Bank
between the Prince and the People . . . by just Judgements to preserve that Law, which ought to be the Rule of every one of the
three [estates].”191
The Answer insightfully summarized this structure as giving
Parliament the “power of punishing,” while reserving to the King
the “power of preferring.”192 This, of course, goes beyond the
“mixed regime” and begins to suggest a true “separation of powers”
theory, with separate authority divided among separate institutions.
“[T]he incroaching of one of these Estates upon the power of the
other,” the Answer continued, “is unhappie in the effects both to
them and all the rest.”193 Thus, to accept the Propositions would be
to abdicate the King’s constitutional duty and abandon the People
to the whims of an absolute and arbitrary Parliament:
188. ANSWER, supra note 181, at 168.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 168–69.
191. Id. at 169.
192. Id. at 170. Thus, the King may appoint, reward, or pardon; while Parliament punishes those who abuse the public trust. Id.
193. Id.
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[W]ithout the power which is now asked of Us, we shall not be
able to discharge that Trust which is the end of Monarchie, since
this would be a totall Subversion of the Fundamentall Laws, and
that excellent Constitution of this Kingdom, which hath made
this Nation so many yeers both famous and happie to a great
degree of Envie.194

Whether Charles himself truly accepted this accounting, particularly as it might limit his own authority, is perhaps an open question.195 There is little doubt, however, that the Answer accurately
foresaw an unwelcome consolidation of power in Parliament.
In the years following Charles’s surrender, concerns about parliamentary supremacy began to emerge even from within the body
itself. As M. J. C. Vile observes:
The divisions within the parliamentary camp were deep and serious. Presbyterians, Independents, and Levellers, were deeply
hostile to each other, and other sectarian divisions loomed ominously. The use of Parliament by one group of its supporters to
threaten other groups had shown to men who had previously
seen only the royal power as a danger, that a parliament could be
as tyrannical as a king.196

Perhaps the most radical ideas on this point came from the Levellers, a populist movement dedicated to extended suffrage, the rule
of law, and equal natural rights. Moreover, they presented their
ideas in the novel form of a written constitution. In three successive
constitutional proposals, each entitled The Agreement of the People,
the Levellers and their leader John Lilburn demanded restraints on
Parliament’s authority, including in the exercise of what we now
think of as judicial power.197
194. Id. at 169.
195. STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 176, at 146–47 (Editor’s note).
196. VILE, supra note 93, at 48.
197. AN AGREEMENT OF THE PEOPLE FOR A FIRME AND PRESENT PEACE
(1647) [hereinafter AGREEMENT I]; AN AGREEMENT OF THE PEOPLE PROPOSED AS
A FUTURE RULE FOR GOVERNMENT (January, 1649) [hereinafter AGREEMENT II];
AN AGREEMENT OF THE PEOPLE TENDERED AS A PEACE OFFERING TO THIS DISTRESSED NATION (May, 1649) [hereinafter AGREEMENT III] reprinted in AN ANTHOLOGY OF LEVELLER TRACTS: AGREEMENTS OF THE PEOPLE, PETITIONS,
REMONSTRANCES, AND DECLARATIONS (1646-1659) (Online Library of Liberty,
2014), https://bit.ly/3mVhVXs [https://perma.cc/L67Y-JNPH] [hereinafter LEVELLER TRACTS]. The first Agreement was submitted for parliamentary approval in
October, 1647. The Leveller “Council of the Army” submitted the second in January, 1649; and John Lilburn prepared the third in May, 1649, while imprisoned for
sedition in the Tower of London. Elizabeth O. Hughes, The Levellers in England
and the Adoption of Their Principles in the United States 40 n.1 (May 27, 1921)
(unpublished master’s thesis, University of Southern California) (available at
https://bit.ly/2Uxhd6O [https://perma.cc/YF3X-4PBL]).
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The Agreements enumerated an evolving list of powers forbidden to Parliament. By the second Agreement, these included,
“[t]hat the Representatives intermeddle not with the execution of
the Lawes, nor give judgment upon any man’s person or estate
where no Law hath been before provided”;198 and by the third,
“[t]hat it shall not be in their power to continue or make a law, for
any other way of Judgments, or Conviction of life, limb, liberty or
estate, but onely by twelve sworn men of the Neighborhood.”199
By 1653, the Levellers were even clearer in their criticisms of absolute power in either King or Parliament: “Prerogative and
Supremacy with that of unknown, unlimited Parliament Priviledge,
[are] the very Mothes and Caterpillars of the Fundamental Laws
and Liberties of the Free people of England.”200 Thus, they continued to demand that both institutions surrender, among other things,
elements of judicial authority. In particular, they asserted: “[t]hat
Parliaments are not Executioners of the Law”; that “the whole execution thereof be referred to particular Courts of Justice”; and that,
“[t]he Juries of England are the Judges of matter of Law, as well as
matter of Fact.”201
Notably, the Levellers rooted their structural demands in fairly
radical ideas about popular sovereignty—a conception that would
inform James Wilson’s American vision in important ways.202 For
example, the latter two Agreements appealed to the People’s authority in calling for a reapportionment of parliamentary boroughs,
with representation tied directly to population.203 It was this very
circumstance which Wilson would identify as “the rotten part of the
[English] Constitution” in his push for an apportioned American
Senate: “[A]ll authority [is] derived from the people, [thus] equal
numbers of people ought to have an equal number of representatives.”204 The Levellers also defended the right of revolution when
the King (as agent) ceased to serve the interests of the people (as
198. AGREEMENT II, supra note 197, at art. VII, § 6.
199. AGREEMENT III, supra note 197, at art. XXV.
200. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWES AND LIBERTIES OF ENGLAND (1653) art. III,
reprinted in LEVELLER TRACTS, supra note 197.
201. Id. at art. III, §§ 7, 8, 11 (emphasis added).
202. For an excellent discussion of the Levellers’ ideas on popular sovereignty
and written constitutionalism, and their echoes in America, see Michael Kent Curtis, In Pursuit of Liberty: The Levellers and the American Bill of Rights, 8 CONST.
COMMENT. 359, 367–68 (1991); compare with MORGAN, supra note 16, at 75–85.
203. AGREEMENT I, supra note 197, at art. II; AGREEMENT II, supra note 197,
at art. I-VII.
204. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 97, 126, 208 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1840) (recording remarks
of James Wilson) [hereinafter MADISON’S NOTES].
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sovereign), the same Lockean principle Wilson would assert in his
Lectures on Law in Philadelphia.205 Finally, the Levellers actively
supported jury nullification, even if they did not make explicit its
connection to the right of revolution, as would Wilson in his account of the American jury.206 The Levellers, then, provided the
American founders with the model of a written constitution implementing popular sovereignty through the separation of delegated
prerogatives.
Though far removed from the Leveller’s populism, Royalist
sympathizers, too, began to recognize the importance of a separate
judicial authority charged with identifying the “knowne law of the
land,” to act as settlor of disputes between the King and Parliament.207 From exile in France, Sir Charles Dallison penned The
Royalist’s Defence, in which he hoped to “vindicate” Charles’s fight
against parliamentary efforts to “reduce[ ] the people to an unparallel’d slavery.”208 From its opening sentences, Dallison’s Defence
made the case for an independent judiciary, in language worth
quoting at length:
In every Common-wealth where the tyranny of an Arbitrary
power prevailes not, some known persons are assigned; unto
whom, for matters of law, both the Governours, and the Persons
governed, do submit: For example, where a King hath the Soveraignty, if it be likewise in his power to judge the Law, his authority is Arbitrary: He may then take the life, or confiscate the
estate of whom he pleaseth, and for what cause he thinks fit.
And the same it is, when the soveraigne power is in severall
persons, whatever their number be, and however composed, if
they have also authority to judge the Law by which they govern,
the rest of the People are inslaved to their will.
But herein the Subjects of England are a most happy people;
By the constitutions of this Realm, our King hath inherently in
His Person the soveraigne power of government, but He hath not
authority to judge the Law. The Judges of the Realme declare by
what law the King governs, and so both King and people are regulated by a known law.209
205. Curtis, supra note 202, at 367.
206. FUNDAMENTAL LAWES AND LIBERTIES, supra note 200, at art. III, § 11.
On Wilson and juries, see discussion infra II.A.
207. CHARLES DALLISON, THE ROYALIST’S DEFENCE VINDICATING THE
KING’S PROCEEDINGS IN THE LATE WARRE MADE AGAINST HIM (1648), https://
bit.ly/2GTj4zg [https://perma.cc/JQ5F-GM65] [hereinafter DALLISON]. For a brief
overview of Dallison’s views on the rule of law, see John Sanderson, Charles Dallison and the Rule of Law, 11 J. LEGAL HIST. 239 (1990).
208. Dallison, supra note 207, at Preface.
209. Id. at Preface.
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Dallison went on to offer perhaps the first perspicuous effort to
root the rule of law in a truly tripartite separation of powers doctrine.210 He recognized the deep incompatibility between traditional conceptions of absolute sovereign authority and a “King . . .
regulated by a known law”—and he hoped to provide a structural
resolution.211 And, although he did not conceive of dividing or delegating sovereignty itself, his ideas on the authority of a constituted
judiciary—in the best Bodinian tradition—would provide an important bridge to the American model.212
To be sure, Dallison believed the Crown retained sole authority both to appoint the “Judges of the Realme” and to define their
jurisdictions—the King’s Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, the
Barons of the Exchequer, and so on—and certainly he envisioned
these institutions working primarily to check parliamentary overreach.213 But, once appointed, the judiciary enjoyed the final say
on the law’s meaning and effect, even as binding on the King.214
Indeed, Dallison plainly stated the case for final judicial review of
legislation enacted by the King-in-Parliament:
[I]n case the King, and the two Houses make an Act of Parliament . . . when that Act is passed . . . an appeale lieth . . . unto the
Judges, who have power to determine whether that Statute be
binding or void, and therefore clear and manifest it is, that in matters of Law the last and finall sentence, is the [J]udges of the
Realme.215

Thus, even if judicial appointment remained squarely within the
King’s prerogative, within their jurisdictional bounds these judges
enjoyed the final, and independent, authority to declare the law of
the land.216
210. Id. at Preface (the “Soveraigne power of government, power to make
Lawes, and powers to judge the Law, are three severall things; and . . . ought to be
in three severall hands.”); accord VILE, supra note 93, at 50–52; Sanderson, supra
note 207, at 240.
211. DALLISON, supra note 207, at Preface.
212. Recall Bodin’s account of the “bilateral obligations” that exist between a
King and his “constituted magistrates.” See discussion supra note 62.
213. DALLISON, supra note 207, at chs. V, VI (49, 64).
214. Id., ch. V, at (59).
215. Id.
216. Dallison makes the same argument in a number of ways, to wit: “This
Nation is governed by a known Law, that Law acknowledgeth the King to be our
onely Supream Governour, gives power to the King, with the assent of the two
Houses, and no other, to alter that Law and to make new Lawes, And to the
Judges of the Realme it ascribes the power to finally declare the Law . . . .” DALLISON, supra note 207, at 60.
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Most commentators treat this English term of art—the “law of
the land”—as the antecedent of our Due Process Clause, which
likewise protects individuals from arbitrary government intrusion.217 Dallison dated his own definition back to William the Conqueror, to whom “the people of this Nation submitted” upon the
promise of “Govern[ance] by known Laws”:218
[B]y the Constitutions of the Realme (as now is settled) the Law
of England consists in these three particulars: 1. Generall Customes . . . [which] are generally Law throughout the Kingdome,
therefore called the Common Law. 2. Particular Customes . . .
[which] by antient, constant, and frequent use, is become Law [in a
particular place] although not generally throughout the
Kingdome; [and] (3) Acts of Parliament made by the King with
the assent of the two Houses . . . .219

With these transcendent legal traditions in place, neither Parliament nor King had “an absolute or an unlimited power over the
people . . . .”220 Both exercised authority only through legal
processes, and when either estate did “such things as the rules of
that Law cannot warrant,” it was incumbent on judges to declare
the action void.221
Undoubtedly, the Royalist Dallison intended his Defence primarily as a broadside against Parliament and its unilateral conduct
during the Civil War. All of his examples of departures from the
known law were statutes denying or ignoring the King’s negative
voice, and foremost among these was the Militia Act.222 But ultimately, by framing his case as a defense of the People’s rights, Dallison also constructed an account that would make the separation of
powers a perfect complement to emerging popular sovereignty theories.223 His carefully theorized judicial defenses of the King’s sovereign rights would, in American hands, become an institutional
judiciary charged with protecting the sovereign People against the
potential avarice of their legislative and executive agents. Indeed,
217. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An
Originalist Theory of the Due Process Clause, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599, 1608,
1613–14 (2019); PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 179–218 (2009);
Raoul Berger, “Law of the Land” Reconsidered, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1979).
218. DALLISON, supra note 207, at 3.
219. Id. at 3–4.
220. Id. at 39–40.
221. Id. at 40. Accord HAMBURGER, supra note 217, at 179–218.
222. DALLISON, supra note 207, at 90–97.
223. Id. at Preface (providing a summary of Chapter V) (“[I]f the King or the
two Houses have [the power to Judge the Law], the known Law is destroyed, and
the people inslaved.”).
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in Dallison we see the beginnings of a theory that might marry the
separation of powers to popular sovereignty in support of the rule
of law.
During the transition from Protectorate to Restoration, clergyman George Lawson revisited some of these ideas from a Parliamentarian perspective, and so provided an intellectual link between
the early Civil War theorists and John Locke.224 A Cambridge educated Rector, Lawson’s intellect earned the admiration of several
notable contemporaries, including the Puritan theologian Richard
Baxter, who remembered him as “the ablest . . . man of any I know
in England . . . above all by his great skill in politics . . . .”225 In
particular, two books published around the time of Cromwell’s
death—An Examination of the Political Part of Mr. Hobbes, His
Leviathan, and Politica Sacra et Civilis—made their way into many
private libraries, including Locke’s.226 As the titles suggest, Lawson
took up his political pen primarily in opposition to Hobbesian
moral egoism and its deleterious effects on young university students.227 Along the way, however, he developed a sophisticated
and original account of sovereignty and popular reform.228 He also
divided the traditional executive power into two separate political
functions, one of which rightly belonged with the judiciary.229
In matters “temporal and humane,” Lawson began, there are
“two acts of majesty: [. . .] legislation, [and the] execution of laws
made . . . .”230 The latter, “executive,” power also has two features:
(1) “the right of making officers” and (2) “the administration of
justice.”231 The second executive authority, “whereby justice is administered,” Lawson identified as “the power of jurisdiction,”
which he again divided in two: “Under this head I comprehend, not
only the power of those acts of judgement, more strictly so called, as
convention, discussion, decision of the cause upon [the] evidence of
224. See A.H. Maclean, George Lawson and John Locke, 9 CAMBRIDGE HIST.
J. 69, 69–70 (1947); accord JULIAN FRANKLIN, JOHN LOCKE AND THE THEORY OF
SOVEREIGNTY 87–90 (Cambridge 1978).
225. Maclean, supra note 224, at 72.
226. Id. at 75. There is some dispute over the sequence of these books’ creation. Julian Franklin contends the Politica was written before the Examination, but
not published until three years later. FRANKLIN, supra note 224, at 53, 87. Conal
Condren is less certain about the date of the Politica’s completion. CONAL CONDREN, GEORGE LAWSON’S Politica and the English Revolution 34 (1989).
227. Maclean, supra note 224, at 72.
228. FRANKLIN, supra note 224, at 53–86.
229. VILE, supra note 93, at 60–61.
230. GEORGE LAWSON, POLITICA SACRA ET CIVILIS 51 (Conal Condren ed.,
Cambridge 1992) (1660) [hereinafter POLITICA].
231. Id. at 52.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-2\DIK201.txt

318

unknown

Seq: 36

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

10-FEB-21

13:13

[Vol. 125:283

the merit or demerit, but the execution.”232 Finally, it is the former
“acts of judgement” which Lawson would carve away from the King
as an independent power: “From all this it is evident, that all Jura
Majestatis may be reduced to the legislative, judicial, and executive
power, if we understand judicial and executive in a larger sense,
then they are commonly taken.”233 And in the end, even the “coactive” executive authority—that of “Execution by the Sword”—
can act only in coordination with the separate and independent
powers of legislation and judgment.234 Thus, “there is no power to
punish the good and protect the bad. For the Sword must execute
according to Judgement, and that must pass according to Laws
. . . .”235
Further, by reading the Levellers and Dallison together, Lawson hinted at a deeper insight into the separation of powers as a
structural realization of popular sovereignty. In developing his
modest account of popular resistance and reform, Lawson invoked
the longstanding distinction between “real” and “personal” sovereignty.236 Here he reached back to Besoldus and other postBodinians, who had used these property law concepts to clarify
their own claims about popular sovereignty.237 Like “real” property, “real” sovereignty was unmovable and permanent, whereas
“personal” sovereignty might move between various temporary locations.238 In Lawson’s formulation, real sovereignty was “the
power to constitute, abolish, alter, [or] reform forms of government,” while personal sovereignty concerned “foreign affairs,
peace, war, treaties, embassies; and the regulation of religion and
human law.”239
For Lawson, the real-personal distinction aligned with several
others—the “community” versus the “polity”; the “citizen” versus
the “subject”; and the “ecclesiastical” versus the “civil.”240 In each
case, real or permanent sovereignty is superior. Thus, Lawson asserted, “Real [sovereignty] is in the community, and is greater than
personal, which is the power of a commonwealth already consti232. Id. at 53–54 (emphasis supplied).
233. Id. at 54.
234. GEORGE LAWSON, AN EXAMINATION OF MR. HOBBES, HIS LEVIATHAN,
7–8 (1657) [hereinafter EXAMINATION].
235. Id. at 8.
236. POLITICA, supra note 230, at 49. Lawson frequently uses the term “majesty” in place of “sovereignty”; here arguing, “As there is real, so there is personal
majesty so called . . . .” Id. (emphasis supplied).
237. FRANKLIN, supra note 224, at 67–68; see also discussion supra note 48.
238. FRANKLIN, supra note 224, at 67–68.
239. POLITICA, supra note 230, at 47.
240. Id. at 46–54.
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tuted.”241 Likewise, the “citizen” is repository of those elements of
real sovereignty, which the “subject” cannot cede to the government; and the Church reserves its divine authority even in temporarily submitting to secular authorities.242 And, perhaps most
importantly, those temporarily vested with personal sovereignty
“may, and many times do, forfeit [it] to God, and in some cases
forfeit it to the community or the people.”243
Indeed, in this way the concept of real sovereignty underwrote
Lawson’s theory of constitutional dissolution, by which sovereignty
reverts to the people when the government abdicates its duties as
legal agent:
As this real majesty is a power to model a state, so it is always
inherent and can never be separated; insomuch, that when a form
of government is dissolved . . . the power of the sovereign doth
devolve unto them by the law of nature, or rather it was always in
the people. As this community hath the power of constitution, so
it hath of dissolution, when there shall be just and necessary
cause.244

This theory, precursor to Locke’s “revolution principle,” was the
cornerstone of Lawson’s defense of Parliament’s actions during the
Civil War.245 When Charles violated the known law and broke
away from Parliament in 1642, “the constitution was dissolved, and
the personal majesty forfeited.”246 The King’s illegality left Parliament with no recourse but to allow the people to “alter the former
government or model a new one.”247 At that moment, Parliament
ceased to be a sovereign body and became instead a representative
convention of community will as manifested in the forty county
courts.248
On the eve of the Restoration, then, all the conceptual pieces
existed to lodge the revolutionary prerogative in an institutionally
independent judiciary. Dallison, the Royalist, and Lawson, the Parliamentarian, approached the aftermath of the Civil War from opposite sides, yet each recognized the need for a distinct judicial
241. Id. at 47.
242. See CONDREN, supra note 226, at 104–05.
243. POLITICA, supra note 230, at 49. Lawson is clear here that “the people is
not the plebs . . . but the whole community as a community.” Id.
244. Id. at 47–48.
245. FRANKLIN, supra note 37, at 78–79, 96–100. Condren, again, is less certain about Lawson’s direct influence on Locke. Condren, supra note 226, at
107–11. On Locke’s revolution principle, see discussion supra Section I.A.4.
246. FRANKLIN, supra note 37, at 79.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 74; accord MORGAN, supra note 16, at 88.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-2\DIK201.txt

320

unknown

Seq: 38

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

10-FEB-21

13:13

[Vol. 125:283

authority—neither wholly legislative nor executive—and both
would have seen this institutionalized in a quasi-independent body.
Both men claimed that the known law of the land—the common
law and constitutional tradition—bound the sovereign authority
even of the King-in-Parliament, and Dallison argued that the judges
enjoyed final authority to identify that law. Lawson went on to argue that, upon a substantial constitutional breach, sovereignty reverted automatically to the whole community of citizens. Taken
together, then, we find a popular sovereign of Marsilian and
Bodinian descent, a government delegated temporary sovereign authority contingent upon its respect for constitutional tradition, and
a potential judicial institution empowered to enforce that contingency in the name of the people.
In truth, however, neither man put these pieces together in an
integrated whole. Dallison, though he saw judicial enforcement of
constitutional traditions as the People’s safeguard, never asserted
anything like a coherent theory of popular sovereignty; and he
imagined a judiciary still under the umbrella of executive authority.
While Lawson developed an account of popular sovereignty, he did
not envision judges identifying violations of fundamental or natural
law, leaving such matters to private judgment and to God.249 The
same was true of John Locke, who adopted much of Lawson’s theory of government and the separation of powers.250 It was thus left
to a Frenchman to revitalize ideas about independent judicial
power, and to popularize the constitutional structure by which the
Americans would come to institutionalize revolution as a legal
principle.
3. Montesquieu and Blackstone— Charles-Louis de Secondat,
Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu, was a French judge and political philosopher whose ambitious treatise The Spirit of the Laws
was widely disseminated in the American colonies.251 While the
work’s central thesis is a kind of legal relativism, in which a nation’s
laws reflect the particular “spirit” of its people, Montesquieu also
popularized the tripartite separation of political authority. He was
not the first to delineate distinct legislative, executive and judicial
powers—Clement Walker and Marchmont Nedham, among those
others discussed above, applied these labels nearly a century ear249. See EXAMINATION, supra note 234, at 123 (“Even of Laws [the individual] . . . must within himself . . . enquire, examine, and determine . . . . Yet this
must not be done to . . . raise sedition, or rebel; but we may complain to God, and
by our humble prayers seek redress.”).
250. See discussion of Locke supra I.A.4.
251. See generally Matthew P. Bergman, Montesquieu’s Theory of Government and the Framing of the American Constitution, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1990).
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lier—but it was largely through Montesquieu that this framework
entered American discourse.252
Certainly, his particular vision of judicial power is far more
limited in both substance and scope than what would emerge in the
United States, but the structural separation of a discrete judicial
function is clear. Importantly, Montesquieu would vest this limited
judicial authority primarily in juries253—not in professional judges
or standing courts—and here we find the roots of James Wilson’s
later theory of juries and popular sovereign will.254 Even more importantly, however, contemporary English theorists, including Sir
William Blackstone, would retain Montesquieu’s tripartite structure
but graft on a much-enlarged theory of judicial power and practice.255 It is this modified English conception, then, that would inform the more radical American approach.
After selling his judicial office in his middle thirties, Montesquieu travelled through Europe studying various political systems.256 He eventually settled in England for two years, where he
fraternized with Whig politicians and even earned election to the
Royal Society.257 It was during this study of English politics that
Montesquieu was, in Matthew Bergman’s words, “radicalized” by
the discovery “that the rule of law and political freedom were practical possibilities.”258 And, across the Atlantic, it was his idealized
account of English constitutionalism that became the most cited
chapter in The Spirit of the Laws.259 In particular, the celebrated
passage on dividing political power captured the founding mind:
When the legislative power is united with the executive power in
a single person or in a single body of magistracy, there is no lib252. See, e.g., Max Radin, Doctrine of the Separation of Powers in the Seventeenth Century Controversies, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 842, 855 (1937-1938) (quoting
Clement Walker, RELATIONS AND OBSERVATIONS, HISTOICALL AND POLITIK
UPON THE PARLIAMENT BEGUN ANNO DOM 1640 (1648)).
253. For an excellent assessment of Montesquieu’s sparing description of judicial power in England, see Laurence Claus, Montesquieu’s Mistakes and the True
Meaning of Separation, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (2004).
254. See discussion infra Section II.A.
255. There are a number of excellent books on Montesquieu’s influence in
late 18th century English legal theory. Three I found particularly useful are:
FRANK T. H. FLETCHER, MONTESQUIEU AND ENGLISH POLITICS: 1750-1800 (1939);
DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1989); and PAUL O. CARRESE, THE
CLOAKING OF POWER: MONTESQUIEU, BLACKSTONE, AND THE RISE OF JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM (2010).
256. See Bergman, supra note 251, at 5.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 6.
259. See id.
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erty . . . . Nor is there liberty if the power of judging is not separate from the legislative power and from the executive power
. . . . All would be lost if the same man or body of principal men,
either of nobles, or of the people, exercised these three
powers[.]260

On the eve of the Philadelphia convention, this sentiment had become all but a truism among leading American theorists.261
Montesquieu, however, envisioned the scope of judicial power
quite narrowly; in fact, he saw the judges’ function as little more
than ministerial: “the judges of the nation are . . . only the mouth
that pronounces the words of the law, inanimate beings who can
moderate neither its force nor its rigor.”262 His desire, plainly, was
to cabin closely “the power of judging, so terrible among men” in
hopes of preventing the sort of arbitrary judicial tyranny that had
characterized the English prerogative courts.263 In truth, Montesquieu believed judicial discretion would naturally diminish with the
emergence of constitutional republicanism:
The more the government approaches a republic, the more the
manner of judging becomes fixed . . . . In despotic states there is
no law; the judge himself is the rule. In monarchical states there
is law; and, when it is precise, the judge follows it; when it is not,
he seeks its spirit. In republican government, it is in the nature of
the constitution for judges to follow the letter of the law. No law
can be interpreted to the detriment of a citizen when it is a question of his goods, his honor, or his life.264

One is certainly hard-pressed to find any hint of American-style judicial review here.
Indeed, Montesquieu envisioned a judiciary without the authority to countermand the other branches of government.265 In
this sense, the judicial role was formal and mechanistic, never interpretive: “[J]udgments should be fixed to such a degree that they
are never anything but a precise text of the law. If judgments were
the individual opinion of the judge, one would live in this society
without knowing precisely what engagements one has con260. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, supra note 94, at
157.
261. See PAUL M. SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA 176–80 (1941) (recounting Montesquieu’s incorporation into leading university curricula and his reprints in colonial press).
262. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, supra note 94, at
163.
263. Id. at 158.
264. Id. at 76.
265. See id. at 160; accord Bergman, supra note 251, at 17.
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tracted.”266 This limitation rendered the judiciary quite weak relative to the other branches: “Among the three powers of which we
have spoken, that of judging is in some fashion, null.”267 And it was
partly for this reason that Montesquieu saw a very limited need for
professional or permanent judges, and would instead vest the bulk
of judicial authority in ordinary citizens, in a form something like
the contemporary English jury.268
To this end, he argued that the judicial power “should be exercised by persons drawn from the body of the people at certain times
of the year in the manner prescribed by law to form a tribunal
which lasts only as long as necessity requires.”269 But it was not just
that the sort of judging Montesquieu recommended required
neither education nor expertise. Even more importantly, a jury of
peers was a shield against the arbitrary enforcement of laws against
particular individuals. The “two other powers may be given instead
to magistrates or to permanent bodies,” only because “they are exercised upon no individual.”270 Not so the “terrible” power of judging, by which the state’s will might be brought to bear directly upon
individual citizens.271 Again, James Wilson would enthusiastically
reaffirm just this sentiment in his account of the American jury.272
For this reason, Montesquieu insisted that, “[i]n important accusations, the criminal in cooperation with the law must choose the
judges.”273 Further, these must be “of the same condition as the
accused, or his peers, so that he does not suppose that he has fallen
into the hands of people inclined to do him violence.”274
In delineating a separate and independent judicial power, then,
Montesquieu drew a direct connection to the People, even without
proposing any particular theory of popular sovereignty. The judicial power, even in the limited and formalistic form he envisioned,
functioned as a final safeguard of the People’s rights against the
coercive power of the state. It was for just this reason that Montesquieu would so severely limit judicial discretion: “No law can be
interpreted to the detriment of a citizen when it is a question of his
266. CHARLES

DE

SECONDAT, BARON

DE

MONTESQUIEU, supra note 94, at

158.
267. Id. at 160.
268. See id. at 158; accord Bergman, supra note 251, at 17.
269. CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, supra note 94, at
158.
270.
271.
272.
273.

Id.
Id.
See discussion infra Section II.A.
CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON

158.
274. Id. at 158–59.

DE

MONTESQUIEU, supra note 94, at
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goods, his honor, or his life.”275 An interpretive judiciary
threatened to be every bit as arbitrary and oppressive as any other
form of tyranny; and so the point of institutional separation was not
so much to empower an additional branch of government, but
rather to disempower the executive and legislative branches. The
“terrible” power to judge must be emasculated in scope and then
situated far from avaricious legislative and executive actors—in the
hands of the People themselves. The result, Montesquieu hoped,
would be a practical realization of the rule of law.
Back across the channel, English theorists generally accepted
Montesquieu’s description of a tripartite separation of powers276—
again, it was consistent with much indigenous thought—but largely
ignored his calls for a limited, formalistic judicial function.277 This
is hardly surprising, given England’s rich common law heritage, and
the integral role of common law judges as expositors of natural law
principles. In particular, Sir William Blackstone—though very
much a legislative supremacist—posited quite broad interpretive
powers in the professional judiciary.278 This power was inherent in
common law judging, but perhaps to an even greater degree it underwrote the expansive practice of judicial equity.279 With this in
mind, Blackstone repeatedly praised the work of Lord Chief Justice
Mansfield, the great contemporary reformer who used the common
law to modernize outmoded legal forms.280 Though neither Blackstone nor Mansfield advocated anything like American-style judicial review, they and like-minded theorists laid a firm foundation
for an independent—and powerful—judicial branch. And it was
275. Id. at 76.
276. Indeed, Blackstone opened his description of the English constitution
with a declaration of individual rights seen expressly through the lens of Montesquieu’s threefold institutional division. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 136–38 (Univ. of Chi. 1979) [hereinafter
COMMENTARIES]. The first three such rights are: (1) to a properly constituted
Parliament to prevent laws “destructive of general liberty”; (2) to an Executive
limited by law; and (3) to “apply[ ] to the courts of justice for redress.” CARRESE,
supra note 255, at 154–55. Blackstone later lays out the tripartite model in language almost identical to Dallison and Montesquieu. See COMMENTARIES, supra,
at 259–60.
277. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 255, at 80–90; see also CARRESE, supra note
255, at 133–65. Carrese, in particular, notes that the judicial power is given the
lengthiest treatment in Blackstone’s opening account of the constitution. CARRESE, supra note 255, at 154–55.
278. See CARRESE, supra note 255, at 133–65.
279. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 255, at 83–87.
280. See generally James Oldham, Judicial Activism in Eighteenth-Century English Common Law in the Time of the Founders, 8 GREEN BAG 269 (2005); accord
CARRESE, supra note 255, at 152 (“Blackstone’s model judge is his contemporary,
Lord Mansfield.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\125-2\DIK201.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 43

10-FEB-21

THE PEOPLE’S COURT

13:13

325

around these ideas, particularly as expressed in Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, that the Americans began to
build their own ideas about constitutional judging.281
Blackstone rejected popular sovereignty theories, and instead
located ultimate authority in the King-in-Parliament.282 He thus
also rejected recourse to anything like a Lockean “revolution principle.”283 As a matter of theory, Blackstone saw the legislative
power as uncontrollable in the traditional sovereign sense, and for
this reason many commentators suggest that he rejected any limitations on legislative authority.284 If this is true, Blackstone repudiated Sir Edward Coke’s celebrated opinion in Dr. Bonham’s Case,
which asserted that common law judges could declare a statute void
as “against right and reason.”285 And, in fact, a famous Hobbesian
passage in the Commentaries seemed to do just that:
If the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is
unreasonable, I know of no power in the ordinary forms of the
constitution that is vested with authority to control it . . . the
judges are [not] at liberty to reject it; for that would set the judicial power above the legislature, which would be subversive of all
government.286

But to accept this statement entirely at face value is to ignore much
else that Blackstone had to say about the importance of natural law
constraints—particularly the ancient law of the land—and the inherited wisdom of the common law.287 David Lieberman has per281. See COMMENTARIES, supra note 276. On the Commentaries’ impact in
America, see, e.g., DANIEL BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF LAW: AN
ESSAY ON BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES (Univ. of Chi. 1996).
282. See 1 COMMENTARIES, supra note 276, at 46 (“Sovereignty and legislature are indeed convertible terms.”).
283. See id. at v. 1, 157. (see discussion supra Section I.A.4).
284. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 255, at 38 (reviewing literature).
285. Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (4) (C.P.). Coke was in fact
even clearer: “[W]hen an Act of Parliament is against Common right and reason,
or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the Common Law will control it, and
adjudge such Act to be void.” Id. at (4).
286. 1 COMMENTARIES, supra note 276, at 91.
287. The quoted language appears directly below Blackstone’s claim that Acts
which are “impossible to be performed” or “manifestly contradictory to common
reason” are void. 1 COMMENTARIES, supra note 276, at 91. Blackstone repeats this
theme at various times in various ways. See, e.g., id. at v. 1, 41 (“[Natural law] is
binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of
any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their authority mediately or immediately from this original.”); see also LIEBERMAN, supra
note 255, at 30–55; accord CARRESE, supra note 255, at 156–58 (placing quoted
language in context to show that Blackstone recognized that both common law and
equitable practice allowed judges to avoid unreasonable results).
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suasively argued that these discussions of legislative constraints are
more than the mere “lip-service” Frederick Pollock once claimed,
but rather mark the intellectual struggle of a man attempting to reconcile traditional political forms with a growing focus on legal reform and a new “science” of jurisprudence.288
With this in mind, Lieberman attributes Blackstone’s seemingly absolutist view of parliamentary authority to his larger theory
of legislative sovereignty, not to a crabbed conception of the judicial role: “The interpretive mistake is to presume that Blackstone’s
attitude to parliamentary law-making was fully disclosed in his formal doctrines of constitutional sovereignty.”289 This, of course, is a
critical distinction for current purposes, because a popular sovereign paradigm might well produce a different relationship between
legislative and judicial institutions. Moreover, faced with dramatic
and haphazard legislative proliferation in the decades following the
Glorious Revolution,290 Blackstone approved of judicial efforts to
reconcile or reform defective statutes born of what Jeremy Bentham derided as “the incapacity or inattention of Legislators.”291 In
the end, it was the particular genius of the common law system—
the collected wisdom of centuries of judging—that kept the English
constitutional system stable and on course.
In this vein, Paul Carrese has undertaken a rich exploration of
the “dialectic” Blackstone saw between legislative and judicial lawmaking power.292 This is evident, Carrese demonstrates, in the ten
celebrated rules of interpretation Blackstone posited as a guide to
the common law interpretation of statutes.293 These evince a giveand-take that begins with Parliament’s authority to supersede the
common law by statute.294 The courts might then exercise their “initiative” to interpret and apply this legislation, even if bounded by
“a severe limit” on the legitimate scope of interpretive discretion.295
In this effort, however, the judges were empowered to avoid any
“unreasonable” results deemed “not foreseen by parliament”—at
which point the dialogue might begin again.296 For example, “if an
288. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 255, at 36–52; quotation in Frederick Pollock, A Plea for Historical Interpretation, 39 L. Q. REV. 163, 165 (1923).
289. LIEBERMAN, supra note 255, at 55.
290. Id. at 13–14.
291. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES 160 (J.H.
Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977).
292. See CARRESE, supra note 255, at 146, 144–49.
293. See 1 COMMENTARIES, supra note 276, at 87–91.
294. Id. at 89; accord CARRESE, supra note 255, at 146.
295. CARRESE, supra note 255, at 146.
296. Id.
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Act gives a man power to try all causes that arise in his manor . . .
the Act [must be] construed not to extend to [a case to which he is a
party]; because it is unreasonable that any man should determine
his own quarrel.”297 While this dialectic falls well short of wholesale judicial review, it is certainly a substantial upgrade on the interpretive powers Montesquieu described—and we must of course add
to this the substantial discretion exercised in the name of judicial
equity.298
Virtually all of Blackstone’s theoretical contemporaries shared
his view that equitable practice arose “to correct and soften the
rigor of the law, when through its generality it bears too hard in
particular cases.”299 Thus, John Fonblanque’s seminal A Treatise of
Equity declared, “In every well-constituted government there is
somewhere lodged a power of supplying that which is defective, and
controlling that which is unintentionally harsh, in the application of
any general rule to a particular case.”300 This meant, for Blackstone, that equity itself could not be understood as a system of
rules, and therefore no positive law existed to constrain judicial discretion “even in those cases where a general pattern of equitable
practice pertained.”301 In England, of course, equity was confined,
at least formally, to the jurisdiction of specific courts. For many
theorists, however, some degree of equitable discretion is inherent
in the very nature of all judicial power—though the precise contours of that discretion are still far from clear.302 And Blackstone
ultimately seems to agree: “Equity then, in its true and genuine
meaning, is the spirit of all law: positive law is construed, and rational law is made by it.”303
Blackstone offered this remark, however, as part of his larger
effort to defend equity practice against charges of lawlessness.304
297. 1 COMMENTARIES, supra note 276, at 91.
298. Carrese suggests that we might best read Blackstone as suggesting that
common law judges could borrow from equitable practice in some of these discretionary areas. See CARRESE, supra note 255, at 146–48.
299. 1 COMMENTARIES, supra note 276, at 92. On contemporary views, see
LIEBERMAN, supra note 255, at 74 (citing multiple corroborating sources).
300. HENRY BALLOW & JOHN FONBLANQUE, A TREATISE OF EQUITY: BOOK
THE FIRST 6 (1737) (3d American ed. 1831).
301. LIEBERMAN, supra note 255, at 75. Lieberman here quotes Blackstone:
“Equity thus depending . . . upon the particular circumstances of each individual
case, there can be no established rules . . . laid down . . . .” Id.
302. Id. at 76. Lieberman suggests that “there are few legal topics of the period quite so nebulous as the equitable character of English law.” Id. And, as
gifted a legal historian as John Langbein has called Blackstone’s own attempted
account “baffling.” Id. at 85.
303. 3 COMMENTARIES, supra note 276, at 429.
304. LIEBERMAN, supra note 255, at 84–85.
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This was no easy task within the constitutional sovereignty paradigm he inhabited. If the King-in-Parliament was sovereign and uncontrollable, and the judiciary was a formally independent (thus
non-sovereign) branch of government, what justification could exist
for an unbounded judicial discretion to remediate or soften the positive law? One tactic, evident in Blackstone’s words above, was to
distinguish the law’s “spirit” from its “letter,” and to insist that the
judges were bound to the former at all times.305 The other, perhaps
more common, approach was a reversion to natural law. “[Natural
law] is binding over all the globe,” Blackstone wrote, “in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary
to this.”306 And so, when an Act of the sovereign (or its application) seemed to violate natural law, it fell to the judge to provide a
saving construction, which preserved the Act’s status as “law.”307
Rather than departing from the law, then, equitable discretion empowered the judge to restore a potentially defective Act to its true
and correct legal form.308 This was the best Blackstone could do to
defend the exercise of broad judicial discretion within the traditional sovereign paradigm. A more perspicuous explanation would
have to await the Copernican shift to popular sovereignty.
In both common law and equitable practice, then, Blackstone
conceived of an independent judiciary far more powerful than
Montesquieu’s. In truth, however, Blackstone struggled mightily to
reconcile the potentially unbounded scope of judicial discretion—
particularly equity—with his notions of parliamentary supremacy
and the rule of positive law. Without the innovation of a popular
sovereign, and perhaps more pointedly the written constitution, it
was difficult indeed to reconcile English judicial practice with the
formal doctrines of English constitutionalism. What had made
sense when the judiciary operated under the auspices of executive
prerogative was perhaps impossible to justify as a matter of independent judicial power.309 This was the very tension that the American constitutional model set out to resolve.310
305. 1 COMMENTARIES, supra note 276, at 429.
306. Id. at 41.
307. Id. at 91–92.
308. Id. at 429.
309. Thus, despite Blackstone’s express adoption of Montesquieu’s independent judiciary (one not “joined with executive” or put “in the hands of the King’s
privy council”), 1 COMMENTARIES, supra note 276, at 2601, he still, in places, maintained that “the jurisdiction exercised by [the courts] is derived from the Crown of
England, and not from any . . . intrinsic authority of their own.” Id. at 84.
310. See, e.g., The FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 521–34 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Indeed, Hamilton lifted passages of this paper almost
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II. THE AMERICAN FEDERALISTS
In the spring of 1776, George Wythe and other members of the
Continental Congress solicited guidance on constitutional design
from Massachusetts’s John Adams.311 Adams concluded his brief
response—which Richard Henry Lee later published as Thoughts
on Government—with a soaring rhetorical question:
You and I, my dear friend, have been sent into life at a time when
the greatest lawgivers of antiquity would have wished to live . . . .
When, before the present epocha, had three millions of people
full power and a fair opportunity to form and establish the wisest
and happiest government that human wisdom can contrive?312

For Adams, the impending divorce from England promised an escape from the practical corruptions of the ancient constitution, and
an opportunity to reform and refine those already excellent institutions without the trappings of aristocratic privilege or imperfect legacies of historical accident. And for James Wilson, the most urgent
and important of these reforms must be to first principles:
The dread and redoubtable sovereign, when traced to his ultimate and genuine source, has been found, as he ought to have
been found, in the free and independent man. This truth, so simple and natural, and yet so neglected or despised, may be appreciated as the first and fundamental principle in the science of
government.313

In other words, the new nation would be founded on the hitherto
“chimerical” basis of popular sovereignty. This political paradigm
shift would have profound implications for the American Whigs’
notions of judicial power.
A. Popular Sovereignty: James Wilson
Among the founding generation, no American spoke more
often or enthusiastically about popular sovereignty than James Wilson. Born and educated in Scotland, Wilson had become perhaps
the nation’s preeminent lawyer by the time the Constitution’s framers convened in his adopted city of Philadelphia. As such, he would
play an integral part in both that framing and the ratification dedirectly from the Commentaries. Cf. id. with 1 COMMENTARIES, supra note 276, at
259–60.
311. John Adams, Memorandum Preceding Letter to George Wythe of January
1776 (July 21, 1811), available at Founders Online, National Archives, https://bit.ly/
358jwDu [https://perma.cc/N5MC-H585].
312. Adams, Thoughts on Government, supra note 95, at 200.
313. WILSON, Of the Study of the Law, supra note 14, at 445–46.
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bates to follow. Indeed, Max Farrand identified Wilson as
“Madison’s ablest supporter” at the Convention; and Bernard
Bailyn has suggested that during ratification “it was not so much
the Federalist that captured most people’s imagination as James
Wilson’s speech of October 6, 1787, the most famous, to some the
most notorious, federalist statement of the time.”314 Just a few
months later, in a speech to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention,
Wilson gave robust voice to a uniquely American conception of
popular sovereignty.
While “the great and penetrating mind of Locke” had “pointed
towards” the theory of popular sovereignty, it was the American
states alone that had actually devised political systems whereby
“the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable authority remains with
the people.”315 This was the genius of the written constitutional
model:
Sir William Blackstone will tell you, that in Britain the power is
lodged in the British Parliament; that the Parliament may alter
the form of the government; and that its power is absolute, without control . . . . To control the power and conduct of the legislature, by an overruling constitution, was an improvement in the
science and practice of government reserved to the American
states . . . . [And a]s our constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions.316

By these innovations, then, Wilson suggested that America had finally put popular sovereignty theory into political practice. Utilizing the most recent advances in political science—most notably the
institutional separation of powers—the new nation had finally
brought the beast of state under the yoke of its true sovereign
master.
To be sure, not all Americans understood the translation from
theory to practice in the same terms.317 Unlike some others, Wilson
came to endorse what we might call a “representative” account of

314. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 197–98 (1913);
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
328 (enlarged ed. 1992).
315. THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 456 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., J.B. Lipincott & Co. 1881) [hereinafter DEBATES].
316. Id. at 432.
317. See, e.g., Eric Nelson, Prerogative, Popular Sovereignty, and the American Founding, in POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 13, at 187.
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popular sovereignty and institutional agency.318 On this view, it is
through representation in the departments of government that the
People express their sovereign authority.319 Others, perhaps most
notably John Adams, held what we might call a “consent” view of
popular sovereignty, by which the People could agree at the outset
to constitute whatever form of government they chose, even a nonrepresentative monarchy.320
Wilson’s “representative” conception of popular sovereignty is
perhaps clearest in his vision for the American Constitution. In
Philadelphia, he argued repeatedly for the popular election of the
House, the Senate, and the President.321 As he explained during
ratification,
A free government has often been compared to a pyramid. This
allusion is made with peculiar propriety in the system before you:
it is laid on the broad basis of the people; its powers gradually
rise, while they are confined, in proportion, as they ascend, until
they end in that most permanent of all forms. When you examine all its parts, they will invariably found to preserve that essential mark of free government, a chain of connection with the
people.322

Wilson, of course, could not convince the Convention to provide for
the popular election of the Senate. But this did not stop him from
making the even more futile case for a popularly chosen President.
Though he knew it sounded “chimerical, . . . at least . . . in theory he
was for an election of [the first magistrate] by the people at
large.”323 When this suggestion inevitably failed to gain support, he
instead proposed a framework for what would become the Electoral College.324
Wilson even held to the representative notion that the judiciary
should derive its authorization from the People’s vote, though his
318. JAMES WILSON, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British Parliament, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 14, at 3, 3–7 [hereinafter Wilson, Considerations].
319. In his deeply insightful book, Inventing the People, Edmund Morgan
makes a compelling case that this account is simply narrative propaganda, and that
even during popular elections, wherein “the fiction of popular sovereignty makes
its strongest approach to reality,” the relationship between voting and any real
exercise of popular will or choice was little more than a “charade” in early
America. MORGAN, supra note 16, at 174.
320. ADAMS, supra note 134, at 14.
321. Ian Bartrum, James Wilson and the Moral Foundations of Popular Sovereignty, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 225, 262–66 (2016).
322. DEBATES, supra note 315, at 524.
323. Remarks of Mr. Wilson (June 1, 1787), in MADISON’S NOTES at 48.
324. Remarks of Mr. Wilson (June 2, 1787), in MADISON’S NOTES at 50.
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failure to secure popular election of the executive would make this
connection very attenuated, indeed.325 Popular accountability was
critical for Wilson, however, because he hoped to create a combined executive and judicial council with substantial powers of legislative revision:
The Judiciary ought to have an opportunity of remonstrating
ag’st projected encroachments on the people as well as on themselves . . . . Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, may be dangerous, may be destructive, and yet may not be so unconstitutional
as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect. Let them
have the Revisionary power, and they will have an opportunity of
taking notice of these characters of a law.326

But, even as he failed to convince the Convention to adopt the
Council of Revision, Wilson remained a staunch supporter of Article III judicial review as a safeguard of the people’s sovereign
will.327
Indeed, it was ultimately to the courts that Wilson would entrust institutional, legalized guardianship of Locke’s abstract right
of revolution.328 In his Lectures on Law, Wilson asserted that a socalled “revolution principle certainly is, and certainly should be
taught as a principle of the constitution of the United States and of
every state in the Union.”329 He adamantly rejected Blackstone’s
infamous assertion that such a view would “destroy all law”:330
The revolution principle—that the sovereign power residing in
the people; they may change their constitution and government
whenever they please—is not a principle of discord, rancor, or
war; it is a principle of melioration, contentment, and peace. It is
a principle not recommended merely by happy flattery; it is a
principle recommended by happy experience.331
325. Bartrum, supra note 321, at 265.
326. Remarks of Mr. Wilson (July 21, 1787), in MADISON’S NOTES, at 336–37.
327. Indeed, as Associate Justice, Wilson would have beaten Marshall to the
proverbial punch had Congress not voluntarily revised the statute at issue in the
first Hayburn’s Case. For a full discussion, see Max Farrand, The First Hayburn
Case, 13 AM. HIST. REV. 281 (1908).
328. For fuller discussion of these ideas, see Aaron T. Knapp, Law’s Revolutionary: James Wilson and the Birth of an American Jurisprudence, 29 J.L. & POL.
189 (2014); see Bartrum, supra note 321, at 279.
329. WILSON, Of the Study of the Law, supra note 14, at 443 (emphasis
added).
330. 1 COMMENTARIES, supra note 276, at 162 (quoted in WILSON, Of the
Study of the Law, supra note 14, at 441).
331. WILSON, Of the Study of the Law, supra note 14, at 443.
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The judicial institution that Wilson saw bringing this theoretical
principle to practical life was the American jury.332
It was the jury, Wilson believed, that served as the most basic
repository of popular sovereign discretion. “In all states,” he wrote,
“discretionary powers must be placed somewhere. The great body
of the people is their permanent depository. But on some occasions, and for some purposes, they must be delegated.”333 When
placed in juries, as “nature and original justice” recommend,334 this
authority is “one of the greatest blessings—. . . one of the greatest
securities—which can be enjoyed under any government.”335 Indeed, the American system entrusted the jury with the “tremendous” authority—one “interdicted even to the legislature[ ]”—of
applying the law to the world with individual particularity:
“Neither congress nor the general assembly of this commonwealth,
can pass any act of attainder for treason or felony.”336 Only the
sovereign itself, instantiated in the jury, could decide an individual’s
fate before the law. What better recourse to the source of sovereign authority than to give the People the final word on the law’s
practical application?337
This idea is consistent with Wilson’s overall representative conception of practical popular sovereignty. Describing the necessity
of a broadly representational legislature at the Convention, he
claimed,
The Gov’t ought to possess not only the force, but 2dly the mind
or sense of the people at large. The Legislature ought to be the
most exact transcript of the whole Society. Representation is
made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act
collectively.338

For Wilson, again, popular sovereignty is manifest in elections and
something like mimetic representation. Thus, the jury’s institutional claim to a share of the sovereign prerogative is its democratic
bona fides—it is, quite literally, a random sampling of the sovereign
power itself. Again, this conception would put Wilson at odds with
men like Adams, who maintained that the delegated institutions of
332. JAMES WILSON, The Subject Continued, Of Juries, in 2 COLLECTED
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 14, at 954, 955–62.
333. Id. at 961.
334. Id. at 963.
335. JAMES WILSON, Comparison of the United States, With That of Great
Britain, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 14, at 718, 745.
336. WILSON, The Subject Continued, Of Juries, supra note 332, at 954, 1009.
337. For an earlier version of this paragraph, see Bartrum, supra note 321, at
282–83.
338. Remarks of Mr. Wilson (June 6, 1787) in MADISON’S NOTES at 74.
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sovereignty could take whatever form the People chose, so long as
duly authorized in a ratified constitution.339
In truth, it is perhaps ironic that, despite Wilson’s rhetorical
alliance with Locke, both he and Adams initially endorsed something much closer to a Hobbesian—or a modified Royalist—account of social contract theory.340 Early in his revolutionary
discourse Wilson, like many Americans, took issue with Parliament’s—not the King’s—claims to absolute authority.341 Rejecting
claims of consent based in “virtual representation,”342 Wilson and
others reasoned that the King alone enjoyed the requisite authority
to represent the people’s sovereign will.343 Wilson even resurrected
the King’s dreaded “negative prerogative” as a potential refuge for
Americans against parliamentary overreach.344 It was only in response to suggestions that this Royalist conception of sovereign
unity could not account for sustained popular dissent that Wilson
fully developed his “representative” account of institutional legitimacy.345 And, in the end, this account provides shaky grounds indeed for locating a sweeping judicial power in a largely
unrepresentative Supreme Court. It would be left, then, to Adams—and his insights into the separation of consensually delegated
powers—to justify our decision to unbundle the sticks of traditional
sovereign power, and to lodge a revolutionary prerogative in an independent judiciary.
B. Separation of Powers: Adams and Hamilton
In the opening chapter of his groundbreaking book The Creation of the American Republic, Gordon Wood emphasizes the
American revolutionaries’ reverence for the English constitution.346
No less a figure than John Adams declared in 1761 that “[n]o government that ever existed was so essentially free.”347 To the Whig
colonials, then, opposition to the mother country was about perfect339. John Adams, Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United
States, in 6 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 95, at 2, 14 6 [hereinafter Adams,
Defence].
340. Nelson, supra note 317, at 198–200. On Hobbes’s differences with the
Royalist account, see discussion supra Section I.A.4.
341. Nelson, supra note 317, at 190–94.
342. Id. at 196–98.
343. Id. at 192–93.
344. Wilson, Considerations, supra note 318, at 30.
345. Nelson, supra note 317, at 208–10.
346. WOOD, CREATION, supra note 171, at 10–28.
347. Id. at 11.
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ing—not abandoning—the ancient English structures.348 As Wood
observes, “They sincerely believed they were not creating new
rights or new principles, but saw themselves claiming ‘only to keep
their old privileges,’ the traditional rights and principles of all Englishmen, sanctioned by what they thought has always been.”349
And so when Adams sat down to devise distinctly American forms
of government, he first planned to,
[S]tudy the law of nature; search into the spirit of the British constitution; read the histories of ancient ages; contemplate the great
examples of Greece and Rome; [and] set before [myself] the conduct of our own British ancestors, who have defended for us the
inherent rights of mankind against foreign and domestic tyrants
and usurpers . . .350

Adams and fellow anglophile Alexander Hamilton would then do
as much as anyone to preserve the basic architecture of the English
constitution, even while reconciling it to the emergent popular sovereignty paradigm. This final subsection explores the results of that
effort for American judicial power.
In February of 1761, Boston lawyer James Otis appeared
before the Massachusetts Superior Court to challenge a century old
British statute authorizing the court to issue writs of assistance for
the general search of colonial homes.351 Citing, inter alia, Coke’s
decision in Dr. Bonham’s Case, Otis made one of the first American arguments for judicial review of an Act of Parliament:352 “An
act against the constitution is void; an act against natural equity is
void; and if an Act of Parliament should be made in the very words
of this petition, it would be void. The executive Courts must pass
such acts into disuse.”353 His reference to the “executive Courts”
belies Otis’s appeal to the dependent judicial structure of the ancient constitution, to which, again, most colonists still turned for

348. Id. at 13. Indeed, it was the internal corruption of the English constitution that the Whigs set themselves against. Id.
349. Id. (quoting John Adams, Novanglus, in 4 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS,
supra note 95, at 11, 131).
350. John Adams, Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, in 3 WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 95, at 445, 462.
351. M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 312 (1978).
352. On Coke, see id. at 485. On judicial review, see GERBER, supra note 4,
at 91. Gerber notes two earlier arguments for judicial review in South Carolina.
Id. at n.86.
353. James Otis, Speech in the Writs of Assistance Case, (Feb. 24, 1761), in 2
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 95, at 522.
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vindication. Otis succeeded in getting a temporary delay from the
court, but he eventually lost the case.354
John Adams was in the gallery that afternoon and would later
recall how “great an influence [the incident had] over his subsequent career.”355 Otis’s argument, and its rejection, made clear to
Adams, for perhaps the first time, that revolution was inevitable:
“A contest appeared to me to be opened, to which I could foresee
no end, and which would render my life a burden, and property,
industry, and everything insecure.”356 Indeed, Adams would later
claim the corruption was so deep that Chief Justice Thomas Hutchison had received his judicial commission specifically so that he
might uphold the dubious writs.357 So alienated had the English
administration grown from the natural law and its own first principles that, for Adams, a “collision” with the colonial conscience was
unavoidable.358 The American Whigs could never accept the second-class status Parliament pressed upon them, and Adams vowed
“to die . . . with a decent grace, should that trial become
inevitable.”359
Still, he did not yet conceive of the crisis in terms of constitutional design, and even five years later he spoke approvingly of the
executive court paradigm.360 By 1773, however, when Adams disputed Loyalist General William Brattle in the pages of the Boston
Gazette, his support for greater judicial independence had become
clear. In a series of essays, Adams responded to Brattle’s efforts to
dispel fears about the King’s decision to put the judges of the Massachusetts Superior Court on the royal payroll.361 Both in oration
and in print, Brattle had claimed that the colonial judges would
hold their offices during good behavior “as the judges of England
have their salaries granted them,” which would render them “independent both upon the king and the people.”362 It was of no mo354. SMITH, supra note 351, at 430–35.
355. John Adams, Diary: With Passages from an Autobiography, in 2 WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 95, at 1, 124 n.1 [hereinafter Adams, Diary]. For
more on Adams’s involvement and reaction to the case, see SMITH, supra note 351,
at 135–42.
356. Adams, Diary, supra note 355, at 1, 124 n.1.
357. SMITH, supra note 351, at 136.
358. Adams, Diary, supra note 355, at 1, 124 n.1
359. Id.
360. GERBER, supra note 4, at 91.
361. Editorial Note, in 1 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 252, 252–55 (Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1977), https://bit.ly/3jPPMQp [https://perma.cc/
TZT4-UXS6].
362. William Brattle, To the Printers, MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE (Jan. 4,
1773), in 3 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 95, at 516, 517.
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ment, Brattle argued, that there were no statutory assurances of this
protection, because “the common law of England” had long assumed the lifetime tenure of judges.363 He then challenged anyone
“who had leisure” to dispute his legal claims.364
Always an eager combatant, Adams took up that challenge in a
series of seven published essays.365 In typical fashion, he produced
an avalanche of quotations demonstrating that tenure during good
behavior was a recent statutory development, applicable only in
England,366 with no appreciable roots in the common law.367 Indeed, he suggested that one need look no further than the arbitrary
removal of so celebrated a jurist as Sir Edward Coke, or King
James II’s subsequent decision to remove Coke’s replacement and
three others, to understand that judges traditionally served at the
Crown’s pleasure.368 Of the latter removals Adams wrote, “There
is not in history a more terrible example of judges perishing at the
royal nod than this, nor a stronger evidence that the power and
prerogative of removing judges at pleasure were allowed to be, by
law, in the crown.”369 And, while Parliament had recently acted to
better protect judicial independence at home, it was still happy to
foist the unfortunate executive court paradigm upon the colonies.
This, Adams would argue moving forward, was a structural failing
that Americans must redress in crafting their own constitutions.
This was a central argument in Thoughts on Government, Adams’s broadly influential response to George Wythe’s inquiries on
constitutional design.370 “The dignity and stability of government
in all its branches . . . depend so much upon an upright and skillful
administration of justice,” he began,
[T]hat the judicial power ought to be distinct from both the legislative and executive, and independent upon both, that so it may
363. Id. at 527, 518 (“These points of law have been settled and determined
by the greatest sages of the law, formerly and more lately.”).
364. Editorial Note, supra note 361, at 254.
365. The entire series can be found under the title On the Independence of the
Judiciary in 3 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 95, at 519–74.
366. Id. at 520 (“The power of the crown to grant salaries to any judges in
America is derived solely from the late act of parliament, and that gives no power
to grant salaries for life or during good behavior.”).
367. See id. at 527–28 (quoting Blackstone’s claim that a recent statute—13
W. III. c. 2—provided that judicial “commissions shall be made, not, as formerly,
durante bene placito [at pleasure], but quamdiu se bene gesserint [during good
behavior]”).
368. Id. at 528, 530.
369. Id. at 529.
370. See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 103 (2001) (“Little that Adams
ever wrote had such effect as his Thoughts on Government.”).
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be a check upon both, as both should be checks upon that. The
judges, therefore, . . . should not be dependent upon any man, or
body of men. To these ends, they should hold estates for life in
their offices; or, in other words, their commissions should be during good behavior, and their salaries ascertained and established
by law.371

Adams’s disseminated his pamphlet widely in the winter and spring
of 1776, as the American colonies anticipated the break with England and began to devise independent constitutional forms of their
own.372 In his own Massachusetts, such an effort had been underway since the spring of 1775, though an official committee was not
empaneled for another two years.373 After a 1778 proposal failed to
gain sufficient popular support, there was some doubt whether the
public would favor any permanent form of government at all.374 By
the fall of 1779, however, a convention of delegates met in Boston
for the exclusive purpose of forming a state constitution.375
Adams himself wrote the initial draft of the Massachusetts
Constitution of 1780, which some hold out as the oldest written
charter in the world.376 Even in its Preamble, the draft identified a
“duty” to structure republican government around the three fundamental powers, thus “to provide for an equitable mode of making
laws, as well as for an impartial interpretation and faithful execution of them.”377 And in the immediately subsequent Declaration
of Rights, Adams included the newly ascendant principle of popular
sovereignty,378 Locke’s revolution principle,379 and the essential
371. Adams, Thoughts on Government, supra note 95, at 198. Adams repeated this passage verbatim in a subsequent response to a North Carolina delegation’s request for assistance. John Adams, To John Penn, in 4 WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS, supra note 95, at 203.
372. Editorial Notes, in 4 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 95, at 190.
373. Charles F. Adams, Observations on the Reconstruction of Government in
Massachusetts During the Revolution, in 4 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 95,
at 212, 213–14.
374. Id. at 215.
375. Id.
376. Id. Adams joined his cousin Samuel and Judge James Bowdoin on the
sub-committee chosen to draft the document; the sub-committee then assigned the
task to Adams alone. Id. On the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, see
GERBER, supra note 4, at 87.
377. The Report of a Constitution, or Form of Government, for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Preamble, in 4 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 95, at
219, 219–20.
378. Id. art. V (“All power residing originally in the people . . . the several
magistrates and officers . . . are their substitutes and agents . . . .”).
379. Id. art. VII (“[T]he people alone have an incontestable, unalienable, and
indefeasible right to institute government; and to reform, alter, or totally change
the same .”).
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right to an independent judiciary.380 On the latter point, he hoped
to codify his response to Wythe:
It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every individual,
his life, liberty, property, and character, that there be an impartial interpretation of the laws, and administration of justice. It is
the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial,
and independent as the lot of humanity will admit. It is, therefore, not only the best policy, but for the security of the rights of
the people and of every citizen, that the judges should hold their
offices as long as they behave themselves well, and that they
should have honorable salaries ascertained and established by
standing laws.381

Significantly, Adams here affirmatively made the institutional step
that Locke had been unwilling to take a century earlier: An independent judiciary must serve as the neutral third-party for appeals
to the rights reserved from the social contract.382
In this way, then, Adams presaged James Wilson’s argument
for institutionalizing Locke’s revolution principle within the
courts—with one very significant difference.383 Where Wilson’s reliance on the “representative” conception of popular sovereignty
forced him to locate the revolutionary prerogative in juries, Adams’s popular “consent” model enabled him to vest it in constitutional judges. He made this case in his Defence of the Constitutions
of the Governments of the United States, published in 1787 during
his ambassadorship in London.
Adams began by challenging a maxim credited to Marchmont
Nedham: “[T]he people, (that is, such as shall be successively chosen to represent the people) are the best keepers of their own liberties . . . because they never think of usurping over other men’s
rights, but mind which way to preserve their own.”384 Even accepting Nedham’s “confus[ed]” definition of the People, Adams argued that a representative assembly are, in fact, “not the best
keepers of the people’s liberties or their own, if you give them all
the power, legislative, executive, and judicial.”385 Without an institutional separation of powers, he claimed “a majority . . . would
invade the liberties of the minority sooner and deeper than an abso380. Id. art. XXIX–XXX.
381. Id. art. XXX.
382. See discussion supra notes 87–88 (arguing that this appeal must be made
to God in the form of revolution).
383. See discussion supra notes 337–39 (on juries and revolution principle).
384. Adams, Defence, supra note 339, at 2, 6.
385. Id. at 7 (emphasis supplied).
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lute monarchy.”386 Indeed, Nedham’s conclusion—that the people
“never think of usurping over other men’s rights”—was patently
absurd and only begged the question “[then] what occasion can
there be for government at all?” Rather, Adams suggested,
Nedham’s proposition should be reversed to say that majorities
“mind so much their own [rights], that they never think enough of
others.”387 In truth, the popular sovereign promised to be every bit
as tyrannical as any despot without the constraints of a divided institutional structure.388
For Adams, the problem with Wilson’s “representative” conception of popular sovereign governance, then, is that it fails to account for minority interests and rights in any systematic way. In
fact, while representation is valuable, it is not essential—and on its
own could hardly deliver on the promise of a stable republican government. Rather, Adams endorsed a quasi-Hobbesian model
grounded in a recognized moment of popular consent:
If the original and fountain of all power and government is in the
people, as undoubtedly it is, the people have as clear a right to
erect a simple monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, or an equal
mixture, or any mixture of the three, if they judge it for their
liberty, happiness, and prosperity, as they have to erect a democracy . . . .389

Democratic representation, in other words, is not the legitimating
feature of a government grounded in popular sovereignty. What
matters is the consensual delegation of the People’s sovereign powers—in whatever form or admixture—to a particular arrangement
of political institutions. With that said, the People also retain the
sovereign right to withdraw that consent at any time and start over:
“[T]he same people have at all times a right to interpose, and to
depose for maladministration—to appoint anew.”390 If quasiHobbesian on the front end, then, Adams’s vision was expressly
Lockean on the back end.
To return to the property law analogies prevalent in the popular sovereignty literature,391 Adams’s account lends itself easily to
the “bundle of sticks” trope often used to describe property rights.
In this context, we might think of these sticks as representing various sovereign powers and prerogatives, which might be distributed
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 117.
Id.
See discussion supra I.A.3.
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to various institutions in various ways, perhaps with certain future
interests contingent upon conditions subsequent.392 In the state of
nature, the People hold the entire bundle of sovereign prerogatives,
which, through a ratified constitutional agreement, they may delegate as they see fit. As discussed in the introduction, Michael McConnell has done remarkable work detailing the negotiated
allocation of these sticks between the executive and legislative
branches.393 I suggest that we can fairly infer from Adams that the
sovereign prerogative to declare breaches of the delegation agreement itself—to announce the constitutional law of the land—fell to
the judiciary. For Adams it was not necessary, as Wilson argued, to
lodge this revolutionary prerogative in a representative judicial
body like the jury, so long as the People consented to lodge it somewhere. Of course, the People always retain the right to reclaim this
prerogative through constitutional amendment or dissolution, but
to take either of these steps is to enter the state of exception—and
so, in the United States, the Supreme Court represents the final
intra vires appeal to the rule of constitutional law.
Like Adams, Alexander Hamilton had great admiration for the
English constitution, whose “fundamental principles,” he argued,
“are in our favor.”394 He, too, initially adopted a quasi-Royalist
position, whereby Americans owed no fealty to the English legislature: “[W]e may pronounce it a matter of undeniable certainty,
that the pretensions of Parliament are contradictory to the law of
nature, subversive of the British constitution, and destructive of the
most solemn compacts.”395 It was this last treachery—the breach of
the sovereign social contract—that would eventually enable Hamilton to make a full-throated defense of judicial review, even over
many contemporary Whig objections.396 After all, the popular sovereign model, with its concomitant notions of limited government,
required some institutionalized protection for the constitutional

392. The trope is thought to have roots in Blackstone, with later refinements
by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld and Tony Honoré. See, e.g., Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORN. L. REV. 531, 543–47
(2005).
393. See McConnell, supra note 1.
394. Alexander Hamilton, A Full Vindication of the Measures of Congress
(Dec. 15, 1774), reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 1, 3 (John
C. Hamilton ed., 1850).
395. Id. at 6–7.
396. See WOOD, CREATION, supra note 171, at 455–64 (recounting objections
to and defenses of judicial review).
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contract itself.397 It was this popular sovereign paradigm shift,
rooted not in representative institutions, but in Adamsian notions
of consent, that made Hamilton’s view possible. In Gordon
Woods’s words,
What made such a judicial power comprehensible, Hamilton
acutely realized, was the changed relation that had taken place
between the people and their supposed representatives in the
legislature. The representatives of the people were not really the
people, but only the servants of the people with a limited delegation authority to act on behalf of the people.398

For Hamilton, this meant that some “intermediate body” must
judge the terms of the People’s sovereign delegation to their temporary political agents.399 In Federalist 78, Hamilton laid out the institutionalization of this revolutionary prerogative in what Wood
identifies as “the most concise and frank defense of judicial review
[written] in the 1780’s.”400
Though much has been made of Hamilton’s description therein
of the judiciary as “the least dangerous” branch, it was precisely the
Court’s worldly weakness that made it the ideal repository of the
remarkable revolutionary prerogative.401 That prerogative itself, if
joined with executive or legislative prerogatives, would give republican liberty “every thing to fear.”402 Indeed, Hamilton understood
Montesquieu’s (whom he cited directly) concerns about the “terrible” power of judging, and echoed the latter’s desire to cabin this
authority far from the powers of purse or sword.403 Thus, it was not
the essence of the new judicial power that was weak or impotent, it
was only that the Court lacked practical mechanisms to enforce its
substantial decision-making authority. It was, in fact, the potentially broad sweep of the discretion lodged in the courts that made
factional independence so vital within “the citadel of the public justice and public security.”404 With this in mind, Hamilton’s primary
397. Id. at 462 (“But since the American governments were limited, the judiciary must also defend the constitution against violations by other departments,
particularly the legislature.”).
398. Id. (emphasis added).
399. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 310, at 525.
400. WOOD, CREATION, supra note 171, at 462.
401. Alexander Bickel’s ironical title is perhaps most responsible for the
phrase’s fame—even if the book itself is an underwhelming piece of constitutional
theory. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1963).
402. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 310, at 523.
403. Id. at 523.
404. Id. at 523–34.
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purpose in Federalist 78 was to explain the structural necessity of
delegating this extraordinary prerogative to the judicial branch.
The explanation he provided could hardly be a clearer statement of the Court’s institutional role as neutral arbiter of the Lockean revolutionary appeal. Thus, the constitutional limits placed on
the People’s delegations to the political branches,
. . . can be preserved in practice in no other way than through the
medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare
all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void.
Without this, all reservations of particular rights or privileges
would amount to nothing.405

Hamilton was certainly aware that judicial review of this kind might
“imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power,” which
both Hobbes406 and Blackstone407 had found unacceptable. He
pointed out, however, that this objection is entirely inapposite
within the new popular sovereign paradigm, which “only supposes
that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where the
will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to
that of the people declared in the constitution, the judges ought to
be governed by the latter.”408 It is simply not the case, as Hobbes
supposed, that only one of these institutions can be sovereign;
rather, the People may contingently empower both institutions to
exercise different sovereign prerogatives.
Hamilton further explained why the courts must be the sole
delegated repository of the revolutionary prerogative:
If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they
put upon them is conclusive upon other departments, it may be
answered that this cannot be the natural presumption . . . . It is
not otherwise supposed that the constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to
that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose that
the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the
people and the legislature, in order . . . to keep the latter within the
limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is
the proper and peculiar province of the courts.409
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.

Id. at 524.
See discussion supra I.A.4
See discussion supra I.B.3.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 310, at 525.
Id. at 524–25 (emphasis supplied).
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While Hamilton here addressed judicial authority vis-à-vis the legislature, his arguments apply with equal perspicuity and force against
the executive branch. Unless and until the People withdraw the
revolutionary prerogative, it remains entirely committed to the
judiciary.
It was the American Whigs, then, that took the final theoretical
and institutional steps necessary to put the idea of popular sovereignty into political practice through the mechanism of constitutionally separated powers. James Wilson understood that a true
popular sovereign structure requires some institutionalized appeal
of the social contract itself, and that the Lockean revolution principle “certainly is, and certainly should be taught as, a principle of the
constitution of the United States.”410 While he placed that principle in the judiciary’s charge, his representative conception of popular sovereignty forced him to lodge the prerogative in juries, rather
than judges. John Adams likewise recognized the fundamental necessity of Locke’s principle, but his consent-based account of popular sovereignty allowed him to unbundle the sticks of sovereign
prerogative, and to vest the courts themselves with the authority to
declare the People’s sovereign will. And finally, in Federalist 78,
Alexander Hamilton made the clear and concise case for the institutional mechanics of all this in the doctrine of judicial review,
which locates final intra vires interpretive discretion in the Supreme
Court. Centuries of evolving thought about popular sovereignty
and the separation of powers had finally merged in the creation of a
uniquely American conception of judicial power.411
CONCLUSION
The American judicial prerogative—what I have called here
the “revolutionary prerogative”—represents a synthesis of political
ideas that developed over two millennia of human experience and
institutional innovation. In particular, the long-evolving doctrines
of popular sovereignty and the separation of powers came together
410. Wilson, Of the Study of the Law, supra note 14, at 443.
411. I have tried to indicate throughout that this is a distinctly Whiggish history of American constitutional structure. As noted above, more Republican
voices—most notably Jefferson and Madison—were much less trusting of judges,
and much more willing to take a “departmentalist” view of judicial review. Without discounting these distinct strands of constitutional thought, my view is that the
Whig conceptions make much better sense of the popular sovereign structural
model, and are more consistent with the predominant developments in English
and continental political theory over the previous centuries. Whig conceptions
would largely carry the day in early American practice, as well, though this must
be the subject of future work.
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in a distinctly American constitutional structure. Popular sovereignty theorists like Marsilius and Jean Bodin distinguished between the concepts of sovereignty and government, and located
ultimate political authority in the People themselves. In early Enlightenment England, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke theorized
that the People delegate sovereign authority to their political agents
through a social contract and, in Locke’s account, may withdraw
that authority at any time through dissolution or revolution. Separation of powers doctrine, with origins in Aristotle’s classical mixed
regime, developed during the English Civil War into the institutional division of three separate political functions: legislation,
judgment, and execution. In the years leading up to the American
founding, William Blackstone struggled to reconcile the newly independent English courts—with their common law discretion and equitable powers—to traditional notions of constitutional sovereignty
and legislative supremacy. The Americans would ultimately resolve
this tension by incorporating separation of powers doctrine into the
popular sovereign paradigm.
James Wilson was the most prominent expositor of popular
sovereignty during the American founding. Taking an essentially
Lockean approach, he repeatedly emphasized the importance of institutionalizing the so-called “revolution principle”—the People’s
right to appeal violations of the social contract—within the constitutional structure. While Wilson recognized the judiciary as the
natural locus of this appeal, his “representative” conception of popular sovereignty led him to vest this discretion in juries, rather than
courts. John Adams, however, rooted popular sovereign legitimacy
in the People’s ratifying “consent” to a constitutional scheme. This
conception permits the People to divide the sticks of sovereign prerogative in various ways, including among separate legislative, judicial, and executive branches. Adams then argued that an
independent judiciary, comprised of life-tenured judges, is best
positioned to exercise the revolutionary prerogative to declare that
government has exceeded its delegated authority. Finally, in Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton explained how popular sovereignty resolves Blackstone’s legislative supremacy dilemma, and why the
judiciary alone must decide any disputes over the People’s constitutionally limited delegations of authority.
The late Charles Black once observed that appeals to constitutional structure may not decrease the frequency or vehemence of
our legal disagreements, but, he suggested, “at least we would be
differing on exactly the right thing, and that is no small gain in the
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law.”412 Before we begin disagreeing about how or why structural
considerations should inform actual legal controversies, however, it
is important simply to understand the structure itself as well as we
can. That has been my goal here—to take a fresh look at the theoretical bricks fired over centuries of political thought, and to appreciate how early Americans laid these bricks to construct new
constitutional forms. That construction did not end at the founding,
of course, and there is much more to say about the ways that our
ongoing constitutional practice has reshaped our understandings.
Indeed, the formative impact of that practice over the first three
decades of American political life is the subject of my next study.413
For now, though, I hope I have helped to clarify and justify the
constitutional ideas that first delegated to Article III judges the revolutionary prerogative of judicial review.

412. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITULAW 48–49 (1969).
413. This practice includes not just the Marshall Court’s formative decisions,
but also the popular adoption of corporate principles from the English charter
model, which structured early colonial governance in many places. See, e.g., MARY
SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004); Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
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